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The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it–and nothing else.
Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Path of the Law, Harvard Law Review, 1897.
1 Introduction
Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently
of each other. In this essay, we brieﬂy review the notion of a contract from the perspective
of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on contract.
The review thus provides an overview of the literature for economists who are interested
in exploring the economic implications of contract law. The title, Contracts between Legal
Persons, limits the review to that part of contract law that is generic to any legal person. A
legal person is any individual, ﬁrm or government agency with the right to enter into binding
agreements. Our goal is to discuss the role of the law in enforcing these agreements under
the hypothesis that the legal persons have well deﬁned goals and objectives.1
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1For example, the ﬁeld of corporate governance (see Hermalin(this volume)) is concerned with the design
of legal institutions that ensure that ﬁrms have preferences that correspond to maximizing ﬁrm value.
1This does not imply that the legal persons never make mistakes. In fact, a key ingredient
to understanding the observed form of contract law requires the introduction of some imper-
fections in decision making. Since the seminal work of Herbert Simon, there has been little
disagreement that a complete understanding of human institutions require the incorporation
of errors in decision making, however there is little agreement regarding the best way to
achieve this goal. In this review, we follow the widely accepted hypothesis that imperfect
and asymmetric information are key ingredients into any theory of contract form. We show
that this is suﬃcient to tie together the various strands of the literature. We then outline a
plan for future research.
The review is divided into four substantive parts. The next section focuses upon the
primary legal concepts on which contract law rests - including the notion of a legal person and
what is meant by an enforceable agreement. The legal literature is ﬁrmly rooted in practice,
namely the set of cases involving disputes between parties that have been adjudicated in
court. From this perspective, this literature seems ﬁrmly grounded in reality. At the outset,
we note three consequences that follow from the legal literature’s focus on decided, appellate
cases. First, not every contract gives rise to a dispute. Nor is every disputed contract
litigated at all, let alone to an appellate decision. The set of appellate decisions is thus a
random, probably biased, sample of the set of contracts actually entered and performed.
Second, by their very nature, the courts can be called upon to adjudicate any dispute,
including those that arise from badly drafted or unconsidered contracts. Third, courts do
not have unlimited time to reﬂect on the complex issues raised in litigation; they must decide
expediently. Consequently, we have not a coherent law, but rather a complex patchwork of
decisions and principles that vary with the random nature of the cases brought before the
courts.
In contrast, the goal of economics, particularly the work that follows from the general
equilibrium theories of Walras, Arrow and Debreu, is to provide an understanding of the
broad features of the economy, such as the role of markets in enhancing social welfare and
measuring income and wealth inequality. Section 3 reviews the recent work on the mechanism
design and incomplete contracts literature that lays the foundation for why competitive
markets alone are not suﬃcient to ensure eﬃcient exchange. This literature, much of which
is reviewed in this handbook, begins to lay the foundation of a more complete theory of
economic organization. Here we discuss that part of the theory that is needed to understand
contract formation and enforcement.
The law and economics of contract is reviewed in section 4. Here we discuss the research
2that, in essence, attempts to bring together sections 2 and 3 of this review. This literature
asks a number of questions:
1. When parties write an incomplete contract, how should a court determine the obliga-
tions that the parties have? In the event that a party fails to perform a contract, how
should a court set damages?
2. Can we explain the contracts that private parties choose in the shadow of the law?
3. Can we explain the rules that courts currently use as optimal rules? More generally, can
an economic approach to the law provide a useful organizing framework for observed
doctrine?
Answers to these questions would fall short of a complete theory of law. Such a theory would
have two complementary parts. A normative part would identify the interpretive rules and
damage remedies a court ought to adopt and implement. A positive part would provide a
model of the structure and evolution of the law over time. At the moment such a theory does
not exist. Aside from the sheer complexity of observed legal rules and institutions, there is
generally relatively little literature that tightly links the models we discuss in this review
with the available evidence.
2 Contract Law
In this section, we set out the legal view of contract. We begin with the legal view of agency
for two reasons. First, it provides a sharp contrast with the economic view. Second, as
most contracts are between ﬁrms, we require a conception of a ﬁrm and when a transaction
is between ﬁrms rather than within a ﬁrm. Our conception of a ﬁrm will rely on some
basic legal concepts that have consequences for the legal treatment of diﬀerent types of
transactions. We proceed in the second subsection to a characterization of contract law.
2.1 Legal Personality
The economic agent is characterized by her preferences; the legal agent is characterized by
her legal capacities to hold and convey property, to make contracts, and to sue and be
sued. These capacities are central to each of the diﬀerent legal forms that a ﬁrm might take:
3sole proprietorship, partnership, business corporation, trust, or not-for-proﬁt corporation.2
Natural persons (who have reached the age of majority and are mentally competent) also
have these properties. Hansmann (this volume) discusses the importance of asset ownership
(and, implicitly, some aspects of exposure to suit). As Hansmann notes, legal personality
segregates a set of assets owned by the entity. Consider for example a corporation C. C owns
some set of assets A that are subject to claims from other persons. Liability of C is limited
(to the asset pool A) because the corporate form protects the assets of other legal persons,
in particular, the owners of C, from valid legal claims against C.3
We focus on the legal person’s right to make contracts and to sue and be sued. Legal
persons act through natural persons. When the legal person is simply a natural person, both
action and identiﬁcation of which acts are attributable to her is relatively straightforward.
Many legal persons, however, are complex; they are constituted by and encompass large
numbers of other legal persons, both natural and artiﬁcial. For example, law ﬁrms thirty
years ago were typically organized as partnerships. Each partner was a natural person as were
all employees of the partnership (but not all its clients, many of whom were corporations).
Some actions of the partners and their employees were attributable to the partnerships
and others not. Similarly, a business corporation has shareholders, managers, directors,
employees, and customers; some members of each of these classes may be natural persons
but others may be corporations. It may also own, wholly or in part, other corporations.
Corporations, of course, act only through individuals.
Two bodies of law solve these problems of attribution: organizational law and agency law.
Organizational law addresses problems of the internal organization of the ﬁrm or legal person.
Often, in conjunction with constitutional documents of the ﬁrm – in business corporations the
articles of incorporation and the by-laws - organizational law identiﬁes a decision procedure
for the ﬁrm. In business corporations, this decision procedure is complex, with ﬁnal authority
for most decisions given to the board of directors though some decisions require shareholder
approval and many decisions are delegated to management.4 The law of agency determines
which actions may bind the legal persons. Under what circumstances, is the ﬁctitious person
2The attributes of legal personality of the diﬀerent forms of business organization vary somewhat. So, for
example, partnerships are not treated as “persons” for tax purposes while corporations are. More importantly,
a partnership can be terminated at will by any partner at any time while corporate death (or dissolution) is
more complex. For a brief introduction to the concept of legal personality see Clark (1986),section 1.2.3.
3The protection of assets of other legal persons is not complete. In some circumstances, a claimant T on
C’s assets may either “pierce the corporate veil” and make claims against the assets of the owner of C when
A is insuﬃcient to satisfy T’s claim or claim assets that have been transferred to third parties..
4On corporate law generally, see Clark (1986).
4responsible for the acts of its agents such as employees? Even a natural person might beneﬁt
from having an agent, someone who can enter contracts for her and make other decisions.
The law of agency governs which actions of the agent belong to the agent and which to the
principal.5 We ignore here actions that lead to harm to third parties and focus on exchange.6
If the agent has actual or apparent authority7 to act on behalf of the principal (here the
legal person), then the principal is bound by the agent’s actions while, generally, the agent
has no liability to the contracting party. The principal grants authority either expressly or
impliedly; in some instances, it may appear that the agent has authority even when she does
not. Agency law places the risk of error on the principal. In what follows, we shall generally
assume that the legal person acts through agents with actual authority.
Legal persons may also sue or be sued. We might diﬀerentiate contracts between ﬁrms
from contracts between the ﬁrm and its employees and from contracts between parts of the
ﬁrm in terms of the remedies available to resolve disputes. In essence, the law treats this
last class of transactions – transactions internal to the ﬁrm (but not employment contracts)8
– diﬀerently from market transactions. Several distinct questions arise here. Consider some
actor X. We may ask ﬁrst: What rights does X have? Second, what forum is available
to adjudicate these rights? More speciﬁcally, are state courts available to adjudicate these
rights? Third, and ﬁnally, if state courts are available, is X able to assert these rights in
this forum? In any given dispute, the law provides complex answers to these questions. We
provide a brief sketch of the legal terrain (in the United States) with respect to disputes
arising from exchange.
In economics, a legal person C is usually a business corporation though, in some contexts,
5Clark section 3.3 oﬀers a brief introduction to agency principles. See also Institute (2006)
6When an individual acts as an agent on behalf of someone else, two questions arise. We emphasize the
question raised in the text: under what circumstances is the principal responsible for the acts of its agents?
This question might arise in at least two contexts: contract and tort. In the ﬁrst case, agency law generally
determines when the acts of the agent bind the principal to contracts that the agent makes on her behalf.
When an agent harms a third party, tort liability arises and the doctrine of vicarious liability determines
when the tort victim also has a claim against the principal. For economic analysis of vicarious liability see
Kornhauser (1982), Sykes (1981) and Arlen and MacLeod (2005).
The second question asks under what circumstances is the agent relieved of responsibility for her actions.
Again, the analysis of contract and tort diﬀers. Usually, agents are not responsible to the promisee for the
contracts that they enter on behalf of their principals. They might, however, be liable to the principal if
they acted outside the scope of their authority. See Restatement (third) of Agency sections 6.01, 6.04, 6.10,
6.11. In tort, agents generally are responsible for actions that harm third parties though public oﬃcials in
the United States beneﬁt from a qualiﬁed immunity from tort liability for actions taken in furtherance of
their oﬃcial duties. See generally Restatement (Third) 7.01
7On apparent authority see Institute (2006) section 3.03
8Contracts between the ﬁrm and its employees are generally governed by contract law, employment law,
or labor law.
5C might be a natural person or a governmental entity. Suppose C is a business corporation.
Hence, C has relations with its employees and its subsidiaries, both sets of which are sets of
legal persons, with outside ﬁrms and with outside consumers. Disputes may thus arise from
interactions among employees or subsidiaries or groups of employees, or between agents of
the ﬁrm and outside suppliers or consumers.
The ﬁrst question concerns the substantive rights the disputants have. The legal per-
son to a large extent makes its own law to govern its internal disputes; Williamson (1991)
makes this point. Thus, our corporation C has the power to determine, within limits,9 the
substantive rights that employees and subsidiaries have against it and the substantive rights
that employees and subsidiaries have against each other. C’s power to makes its own law,
however, may be limited by state law or state law may create a set of default rules to govern
without explicit internal law. Employment law provides a good example. Internal rules may
not violate employment discrimination rules and the doctrine of at-will employment serves
as a default rule in most jurisdictions in the United States. Of course, C and the outside
ﬁrms with which it contracts also have the power, subject to the same caveats, to make their
own law to govern their exchange; this power is granted by contract law.
Turn now to the second question of forum. Suppose two persons A and B, employees
or subsidiaries of C, have a dispute arising under C’s internal rules. As the employment
contract usually delegates authority to the ﬁrm, the state courts will not resolve this dispute
(unless the dispute implicates some statutory right of the employee). Nor would the parent
corporation usually allow its subsidiaries to resort to the courts to resolve an internal dispute.
Now consider two unincorporated divisions D and D’ of C. Neither D nor D’ is a legal
person for purposes of state law. However, even if they have engaged in an exchange with
an "outsider" that constitutes a contract, neither D nor D’ has the power to sue or be sued
with respect to such a claim. To be concrete, suppose Chevrolet and Pontiac, both unin-
corporated subdivisions of General Motors, jointly hire an advertising ﬁrm; the agreement
between Chevrolet and Pontiac provides a formula for allocating the costs incurred by the
advertising ﬁrm. Any dispute between Chevrolet and Pontiac must be resolved within Gen-
eral Motors. (If Chevrolet and Pontiac were corporate subsidiaries of General Motors, each
with a distinct legal identity, then each would have the right to sue or be sued. General
9Contract law provides the parties with great latitude in structuring their relationship but other parts of
state law do constrain the substantive rights. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States bans slavery for instance. More relevantly, US law includes statutes that require equal treatment by
race, gender, age, and disability as well as restrictions on minimum wages and various terms and conditions
of employment.
6Motors, however, might prohibit its subsidiaries from exercising this right.) One may view
many of the contributions to this handbook (for example Hansmann (2010)) as reviews of
the internal procedures and policies that ﬁrms use to govern internal disputes.
2.2 The Law of Contract
A full understanding of contractual exchange requires that we distinguish among four con-
cepts: an exchange environment, a contractual instrument, contract law and contractual
behavior. We discuss exchange environments in section 3.1. A contractual instrument con-
tains the terms the parties bargained-for; contract law, by contrast, may imply terms that
the parties have neglected to make explicit, interpret terms that, in the light of performance,
are ambiguous, or, more rarely, impose a term on the parties; further, the remedial structure
of contract law largely determines the structure of any renegotiation. Contractual behavior
refers to the actions of parties to the contract in light of the contractual instrument and
the prevailing law of contract.We adopt these terms because the common term “contract” is
ambiguous. It refers both to the contractual instrument and to the set of obligations that
result from the application of contract law to the contractual instrument.10
This essay begins to disentangle the role of the contractual instrument from the role of
contract law in the structure of mechanisms. We also specify the constraints that contract
law imposes on mechanism design by articulating some of the real features of contract law.
A contract, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is “an agreement between two or more
parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”11 Diﬀerent
legal systems have diﬀerent criteria for determining the set of agreements that the law will
enforce. In common law jurisdictions such as the United States and Britain, these constraints
are few. The agreement must be suﬃciently detailed for the court to determine the content
of the bargain; in most cases an agreement that required the transfer of goods at some future
date without specifying the quality or quantity of the goods or the price at transfer would
be unenforceable. In addition, for a promise to perform a future action to constitute an
agreement, the promisee must give “consideration” but almost any return promise or action
10In what follows we try to adhere to this terminology but often the use of the term “contract” is un-
avoidable; usually its sense should be clear from context. The diﬃculty is greatest in the discussion of the
mechanism design literature as that literature does not distinguish between the contractual instrument and
contract law.
11The Restatement Second of Contracts, section 1, oﬀers a similar deﬁnition: a promise or set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty”. On this issue speciﬁcally, and on contract law generally, see Farnsworth (1999).
7is now understood as consideration.12
We shall call an agreement that is enforceable at law a “contractual instrument.” We
may think of a contractual instrument as a (partial) list of events and associated obligations
for each party. Contractual instruments, in conjunction with contract law, determine the
obligations that individuals have. Though the law usually enforces oral agreements, we
assume that the agreement has a written form. Thus, a contractual instrument is embodied
in a ﬁxed text that is publicly available so that the parties and any third party enforcer
knows the contents of this text. The contractual instrument in conjunction with contract
law determine the contractual obligations the parties have. We might say, that is, that the
contractual instrument as understood against the background law of contract determines the
contract between the parties.
2.2.1 What does contract law do?
Contract law guides the courts in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual instru-
ments. In eﬀect, the court performs three distinct tasks when it adjudicates a contract
dispute. First, it ﬁnds the facts. It determines what actions the parties took and what
state of the world or nature was realized. Second, it interprets the contractual instrument.
Interpretation requires the court to determine what obligations the contractual instrument
imposed in the realized state of the world.13 If the contract was complete, coherent, and
uncontradictory, some term speciﬁed these obligations. If the contract was incomplete, the
contractual instrument may have failed to specify obligations in the realized state of the
world. In this case, the court must nonetheless determine the obligations of the parties. In
other instances, the contract may be poorly drafted and impose conﬂicting or ambiguous
obligations in some state of the world.14 Third, if the court determines that one or more
parties has failed to meet its obligations under the contractual instrument, as interpreted
by the court, it must enforce the contract; the court imposes a remedy. Remedies may take
many forms.
This discussion of the functions of courts suggests that we assess regimes of contract law
along three diﬀerent axes – the process of fact determination, the interpretative practice,
and the remedial regime.
12See generally Farnsworth (1999) sections 2.2 -2.4. Note also that some agreements must be in writing
to be enforceable.
13Of course, the content of the contract determines in part what facts the court must ﬁnd.
14A poorly drafted contractual instrument might, in one or more contingencies, also specify an ineﬃcient
or otherwise inappropriate obligation. Some poorly drafted contracts impose in some events inconsistent
obligations on a party. I.e., it requires the party both to do and not to do some act A.
82.2.2 Fact Finding
A contractual instrument speciﬁes, against the legal backdrop, the obligations of each party.
Often the obligations of the parties are state-contingent; what each party must do varies with
the state of the world. Resolution of every contract dispute thus requires determination of
the actions that each party took and of the realized event.
Fact-ﬁnding procedures apply across a wide of range of types of disputes and they are
governed by distinct bodies of law (that generally go under the names of civil or criminal
procedure and evidence).15 We may assess these procedures along two dimensions: their
accuracy and their cost. In an ideal world, fact-ﬁnding would be perfectly accurate and
costless. In the real world, the invocation of courts is costly and courts themselves sometimes
err in their fact ﬁnding.16
As we discuss below, the economic theory of contract generally distinguishes observable
actions from veriﬁable actions. Courts costlessly observe veriﬁable actions with perfect
accuracy; courts cannot observe unveriﬁable actions at any cost.17 Most actions and events,
by contrast, are only veriﬁable at some cost and to some degree of accuracy.
2.2.3 Interpretive Practices
Contract disputes often entail more than a dispute over facts. They often include disputes
over the content of the contractual obligations the parties faced. A party’s obligations may
be unclear for several reasons: the contractual instrument may have been ambiguous so that
it is unclear whether an action a satisﬁes the contractually speciﬁed obligation or not; the
contractual instrument may have been inconsistent and required that the party undertake
an action that was not feasible in the realized state of the world or that the party undertake
inconsistent actions; or the contractual instrument may not have contemplated the realized
state of the world and so speciﬁed no obligation at all.
Contract interpretation is the legal practice that determines the obligations of the par-
ties. These practices are complex and diﬃcult to specify. To begin, we consider a procedural
aspect of interpretive practices: the information on which the court relies in deciding what
15We ignore some evidentiary rules that are speciﬁc to contract law such as the statute of frauds which
requires a writing to enforce certain classes of contracts. On the statute of frauds, see Farnsworth (1999)
chapter 6
16We note in passing that the parties may, in the contractual instrument, alter the usual, default fact-
ﬁnding procedures.
17The economic literature treats unveriﬁable actions as a constraint on the contractual instrument.
9obligations the parties have under the contractual instrument.18 The practice may be more
or less inclusive in its informational base. It might refer only to the ﬁxed text of the con-
tractual instrument or it might rely on additional information. It might for instance rely
on statements during the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties. It might rely on the
pre-contractual practice (if any) of the parties – i.e., it might look to prior behavior of the
parties under contractual instruments dealing with the same or similar subject matter. The
court might look to the course of dealing of the parties under the contractual instrument
in dispute. Alternatively, the court might look to general trade practice; that is, the court
might consider how individuals who regularly engage in exchange of the type governed by
the disputed contractual instrument behaved under similar circumstances. We distinguish
textualist practices of interpretation in which the court refers only to the written text of
the contractual instrument from contextualist practices of interpretation in which the court
refers to some information external to the contractual instrument as well as the text. The
understanding of relational contracts generally assumes contextualist interpretation. How-
ever, this simple distinction is suﬃcient to classify the existing literature, which has been
inattentive to the problem of interpretation.
Of course, even courts that adopt identical informational bases might have diﬀerent
interpretive practices. After all, an interpretive practice is a map from the space deﬁned by
the informational base into the set of obligations. Court C might impute one obligation to a
given set of “facts” while court C’ imputes a distinct obligation to the same set of “facts.” We
may better understand these imputation practices by considering the diﬀerent objectives a
court might pursue in interpreting the relevant informational base. The court might pursue
at least three diﬀerent objectives. It might seek to determine what the parties agreed to (or,
if they did not contemplate the realized event, would have agreed to). To accomplish this
aim, a court must recover both the preferences of the parties and their relative bargaining
power.19 Alternatively, the court might seek to determine what “normal” or “average” parties
to exchanges of this type would agree to. To accomplish this aim, the court must determine
the preferences of the “normal” contracting parties. Third, the court might seek to determine
an “eﬃcient” contract. Eﬃciency here might refer to ex ante incentives to invest or it might
refer to eﬃcient risk sharing. Again the court needs to recover the preferences of the parties.
In the stylized world of the economics of contract literature, the parties are rational;
they would themselves thus write an eﬃcient contract. It might thus appear that the third
18Katz (2004) discusses this issue.
19In fact, the court needs a complete theory of how the parties would bargain.
10interpretive aim simply recapitulates either of the prior two aims. This appearance however
is deceptive for two reasons. First, though rational parties would seek to maximize their
surplus, they might divide that surplus in many diﬀerent ways. Hence, the ﬁrst two aims
require the court to infer the nature of a speciﬁc bargain.
Second, the contractual instruments of rational parties are thus clear and well-speciﬁed.
In the commercial world, however, parties are not fully rational; they may make mistakes.
Consequently, contract terms may be vague, unclear or contradictory (in the sense of requir-
ing a party to take inconsistent actions in some state of the world. The court, in interpreting
the contractual instrument, must confront these imperfections and determine what obliga-
tions the parties in fact had under the contract.
2.2.4 Remedial Regimes
After the court determines what happened and what obligations the parties had under
the contractual instrument, it determines whether each party met its obligations under the
contractual instrument (as interpreted under the prevailing contract law). If the court ﬁnds
that some party did not perform as required, it oﬀers a remedy. Again, contract law has a
rich set of remedial rules. We might understand a remedial regime as giving the promisor
an option: to perform or not to perform but make a damage payment. Remedial regimes
diﬀer in the option price, or the level of damages that the promisor must pay in the event
of non-performance. We consider three possible remedial regimes: (expectation) damages,
at-will regimes or no damages (against a backdrop of secure property rights).20
The standard remedy21 for breach of contract in common law jurisdictions is expectation
damages.22 The principle of expectations damages awards the promisee her (subjective) value
of performance. Of course, the court generally cannot observe this subjective valuation; the
common law has developed a number of clever rules to implement the principle that, in many
cases, contrive to deliver to the promisee her subjective value of performance without actually
measuring it.23 In many cases, however, the actual measure of promisee’s expectation leads
20Hermalin et al. (2006) surveys the economic literature on contractual remedies.
21Two types of deviations may occur. In some cases, lesser damages may be imposed and in some cases,
speciﬁc performance, discussed in note below, may be imposed. In addition, the remedial rules of contract
law are, to a certain extent, default rules. The parties may specify a level of damages in the contractual
instrument that would substitute for the court measurement.
22In civil law countries, there is a large group of contracts for which the default remedy is speciﬁc per-
formance, a requirement that the non-performing party meet her obligation. This requirement might be
enforced by charging the breaching party with civil contempt which, in common law countries, might lead
to jail time, or to large ﬁnes.
23Consider, for example, the rule of “cover” which permits an aggrieved buyer to purchase the contracted-
11to under compensation. This under compensation results in part from the procedural rule in
the United States that each party bears her own costs of litigation. This practice contrasts
with the practice in Britain where the losing party bears the winner’s costs of litigation as
well as paying substantive damages.
Expectation damages nevertheless applies to most agreements. It diﬀers dramatically
from the common assumption in the economics of contract literature that the obligation
speciﬁed in the contractual instrument will be enforced. The rule of expectation damages
will lead to radically diﬀerent consequences than the rule of perfect enforcement assumed in
the economics of contract literature.
Traditionally, the common law excepted one large and important class of contracts from
the expectation principle: employment contracts.24 Employment contracts were subject,
instead, to a form of self-help remedy. This form of employment contract is called “at-will
employment.” In an at-will contract, each party has the power to terminate the relation
at any time; the terminated party has no claim for future wages. The doctrine of at-will
employment remains the default rule governing most standard employment agreements in
many states. On this account, the sole remedy of an employer who believes that its employee
has violated the employment agreement is dismissal.
Finally, the law may simply protect the property rights of the parties and not enforce any
agreements at all. In this regime, the parties have no access to the fact-ﬁnding or interpretive
capacities of courts. Courts do, however, protect persons against bodily harm and property
from appropriation by other individuals (and the government). When a promisor fails to
perform, the promisee can enforce the contract only through reputational devices or refusals
to deal. This regime corresponds to a regime of pure “relational” contracts.
for goods on the spot market and to receive as damages the diﬀerence between the market price at which she
covered and the contract price. This rule delivers the promisee her expectation by delivering her the goods
at the contract price (on the assumption that the contracted-for goods were standardized goods available in
a suﬃciently “thick” spot market).
Notice that, generally, the law may oﬀer a number of diﬀerent remedial options from which the aggrieved
party may choose. Section 7 of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code illustrates both the panoply of
options and the elective nature well. In addition, an aggrieved party might rely on either restitution or
promissory estoppel rather than pure contract remedies.
24As noted above, courts applied the remedy of speciﬁc performance to contracts for “unique” goods.
One might, however, understand the rule of speciﬁc performance as an instance (or implementation) of the
expectation principle as, by delivering the contracted-for performance, delivers the promisee her expectation.
At will employment, by contrast, does not deliver the value of the performance to the agent.
122.2.5 Concluding remarks
These brief comments suggest a rich panoply of regimes of contract law against which ex-
change might occur. We consider a few ideal types, all against a backdrop of security of
property rights. At the extremes are anarchy and utopia, the two regimes commonly as-
sumed in the economics of contract. Under anarchy, there is no third-party fact-ﬁnding,
interpretation, or enforcement though each party remains secure in her property holdings.
Under utopia, fact-ﬁnding is perfectly accurate and costless, interpretation is clear and cost-
less, and enforcement is costless and perfect (in the sense that each party performs her stated
obligation). In the world of anarchy, contracts must be self-enforcing; in utopia, the parties
can costlessly bind themselves to any obligation they choose.
Courts, however, decide cases in neither an anarchic nor an Utopian world but in a
world in which fact-ﬁnding, interpretation and enforcement are both costly and error-ridden.
Contracts here need not be self-enforcing but they will not be perfectly enforced. Observed
contracts reﬂect this middle ground (as well as the oddities that result from the eﬀorts of
boundedly rational or irrational agents).25
25We have ignored some complications that arise when parties are insolvent. Our discussion thus far has
assumed that the promisor is fully solvent; it can meet all claims on it. Under this assumption, the promisee
understands that the promisee will either perform or pay damages as measured by the contract rule. In many
actual transactions, however, and in some models, the promisor is potentially insolvent. Insolvency triggers
a shift in the set of legal rules that govern disputes over contracts. Fried (1996) sets out the rules governing
contracts in bankruptcy. He argues that the rules provide the trustee in bankruptcy with incentives to reject
some contracts with expected gains from trade.
Consider a contract at time t0 between a Seller S and a Buyer B for the delivery of one widget at a price
p at time t2. Suppose S ﬁles for bankruptcy at time t1; S is insolvent. If the contract was performed by
both parties prior to t1there is no problem. Suppose therefore that S has not performed by t1. There are
two possibilities: (a) B has fully performed prior to t1 or (b) B has not fully performed by t1(in which
case the contract is executory). In situation (a), B is an unsecured creditor with no priority over any other
unsecured creditors. Of course, Buyer may have taken a security interest in some asset of S’s; then Buyer
would have a prior claim on that asset. In principle, an economic analysis of contracting must now ask under
what circumstances would we expect to see either party take a security interest in some asset? Turn now to
situation (b). S faces a choice. She may either assume the contract or reject it. If she rejects the contract,
then B is once again treated as an unsecured creditor of S. If S, however, assumes the contract, there are
again two possibilities. S might perform the assumed contract in which case there is no problem; or S might
later breach the contract. (At the time t1 of the bankruptcy, the market price for widgets might be p 2; S
therefore makes a proﬁt by assuming the contract. At t2, though, the market price may have risen to p + 2
and S might do better if she breaches.) If S breaches subsequent to assumption of the contract, then B is an
unsecured creditor of S but she now has priority over unsecured creditors whose debts were incurred prior
to bankruptcy.
133 Transactions Costs and the Economic Model of Con-
tract
The economic theory of contract asks two questions. First, it identiﬁes the optimal con-
tractual instrument for a speciﬁed exchange environment, given contract law. An exchange
environment is speciﬁed by the preferences of the agents, the information structure among
the agents and any third party enforcer, and the production technology that determines the
eﬀects of various investments by the parties on the costs and beneﬁts of exchange. Second,
it asks in what contractual environment, given contract law, would a speciﬁc contractual
instrument be optimal.
In posing these questions, we have highlighted the role of contract law; but the eco-
nomic models of contract do not model law explicitly. Implicit in the formalism are strong
assumptions about the legal system. In this section, we try to uncover these assumptions
about the fact-ﬁnding, interpretive, and enforcement competence of courts. The discussion
proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 brieﬂy elaborates on the Utopian ideal in economic theory.
We introduce the basic seller-buyer framework that we use to discuss the literature. Section
3.2 reviews the literature on mechanism design. This literature provides general results on
what is feasible given transactions costs that arise from asymmetric information. Section 3.3
discusses the foundations for incomplete contract theory, namely why parties would leave
out some clauses in a contractual instrument.
3.1 Utopian Economic Theory
The economic theory of contract adopts the basic Arrow-Debreu model of general equilib-
rium as a benchmark. Its assumptions characterize economic utopia. We brieﬂy remind the
reader of the key features of utopia. Each economic agent is characterized by an endow-
ment and a (convex) preference. The production technology is also convex. Markets are
complete. Moreover, economic utopia implies legal utopia: courts have perfect fact-ﬁnding,
interpretation of contractual instruments is unambiguous, and enforcement is perfect.
This assumption of complete markets requires elaboration because it rests on a very
precise deﬁnition of a commodity. As elaborated in Chapter 2 of Debreu (1959), a commodity
is deﬁned by its physical characteristics, its location, and its date. Contractual instruments
governing exchange on commodities markets come closest to the ideal. We may, for example,
trade a contract for red winter wheat #2 available in Chicago on 1 March 2010 or a contract
for red winter wheat #2 available in Kansas City on 1 February 2010. Though physically
14identical, these two commodities diﬀer both in the location at which they are delivered
and the date of delivery.26 The general equilibrium model requires that a market for every
commodity, precisely deﬁned, exist.
Actual exchange falls short of this ideal. Even the most detailed contractual instruments
have gaps in their speciﬁcation of the good to be exchanged. Architectural plans, for example,
specify much of the subject matter of construction contracts but even the most detailed plans
leave the contractor much discretion. No contractual instrument is suﬃciently precise in its
description of the characteristics of a good to be traded that performance can be determined
with complete certainty. Nevertheless, the concept of a good and its associated price is an
exceedingly useful abstraction for understanding market economies.
For purposes of our discussion, we shall suppose that all trade occurs between a buyer and
seller of a good. The characteristics of the good will be denoted by q 2 Q, where Q is a set
(possibly inﬁnite) representing diﬀerent possible characteristics of the good. This can have
various interpretations such as the quantity delivered, the level or quality of service, and so
on. In exchange, the buyer will agree to pay compensation p: Our observations regarding the
impossibility of describing a good simply means that in practice if the seller agrees to supply
 q there is always a chance that the buyer and seller might not agree that seller’s action met
his contractual obligation. The extent to which one models the source of the disagreement
depends upon the context and question at hand.
More formally, we suppose that a buyer and seller wish to enter an agreement to trade
one unit of this good with preferences:
uB = B(q;)   p   ib;
us = p   C(q;)   is:
The payoﬀ that the buyer gets from consuming the good of quality q is B(q;), while C(q;)
is the cost to the seller and p is the monetary transfer between the two agents. This cost and
beneﬁt is a function of an underlying state variable  2  that is realized after a contractual
instrument is signed, but before production or consumption. In addition, each party is
able to take an action, is and ib, after a contractual instrument is signed, that aﬀects the
distribution of the state variable. More formally we let Pr[jib;is] be the probability that 
26In fact, the speciﬁcation “Red winter wheat #2” is not perfectly precise as a particular shipment might
give rise to a factual dispute concerning its conformity.
15occurs given the actions is and is.
This formulation is quite general and includes a number of the cases that have been
considered in the literature (see Rogerson (1992) for a general formulation of this model). We
can specify three paradigmatic exchange environments in the order they have been studied
historically:
1. Agency model: the state varies with the seller’s action,   f(:jis) is a monetary payoﬀ
whose distribution varies with seller’s action, C(q;) = 0 and B(q;) = : In addition,
it is usually assumed that us is the ex post payoﬀ of the seller who is also assumed to
be risk averse ex ante, with preferences given by Us = E[u(p)] is;where u0 > 0;u00 < 0
are von Neuman Morgenstern preferences.
2. Asymmetric information trade model:  = fv;cg is a random variable where v and c
are independently and uniformly distributed over [0;1], q 2 f0;1g; B(q;) = vq, and
C(q;) = cq. In this model, it is assumed that parties observe their own valuations
before trade, but not the valuations of the other parties.
3. Holdup model:  = f;ib;isg, where  is a random variable that is uncorrelated with
the actions. If @B=@is = @C=@ib = 0 then we have the self-investment case - the
action of an agent aﬀects its own payoﬀ, but not the others (see Grout (1984), Hart
and Moore (1988)). If @C=@is = @B=@ib = 0 then we are in what Che and Hausch
(1999) call the cooperative investment case (also studied in MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993)). Parties are assumed to observe , ib and is before trade occurs.
Agency theory seeks to work out the optimal compensation for a risk averse agent when the
principal has a noisy signal of performance. The main insight is that contract design should
take into account how the agent will modify her behavior in response to a contract. Given
this insight, it is assumed that the principal chooses the most eﬃcient contract subject
to the constraint that the agent can reject the oﬀer in favor of an outside alternative. If
the principal cannot perfectly observe performance, then she needs to weigh the beneﬁts
of increased incentive pay against the cost of increased risk. When performance is multi-
dimensional, she also must take into account that a reward for better performance along one
dimension will lead to lower performance in other dimensions.
As Eisenhardt (1989) argues, the basic insights of the model have proven to be extremely
useful for thinking about incentive issues. For example, in a classic paper Slade (1996)
shows that the multi-tasking model can provide useful insights into observed contractual
instruments (see Lafontaine and Slade (2010) for an update on this literature). The model
16is widely used to think about tort law (see Landes and Posner (1987)). It typically assumes,
however, perfect contract enforceability as well as unproblematic contract interpretation, and
hence the law plays a minor role in the theory. The main exception is work that supposes
that employees cannot be forced to pay damages. This assumption imposes a non-negativity
constraint on pay as in Sappington (1983) and Innes (1990). This conclusion raises the
question of why would the law impose such a constraint?
A more serious concern is that the theory cannot explain many features of observed
contractual instruments. Hart and Holmström (1987) observes that agency theory predicts
that optimal contracts should vary with any measure that provides information on either
the productivity or the preferences of the parties to the contract. Yet, as Gibbons (1997)
observes, these generic predictions of the model are simply inconsistent with many features
of observed contractual instruments.
The model also fails to explain two other features of contractual instruments observed in
practice. First, in an agency model the relative power of parties can aﬀect the distribution
of utility, but in general has no eﬀect on the productive eﬃciency of the relationship. As we
shall see, in practice the regulation of bargaining power is a key ingredient in many contracts.
Second, there is no room for conﬂict or error. The principal perfectly anticipates how the
agent will respond to any incentive contract, and incorporates this into contract design. As
Kerr (1975) beautifully illustrates, there are many situations where this assumption simply
does not hold. The next two sections deal with these issues in turn.
3.2 Mechanism Design - Implementing Eﬃcient Exchange
In the paradigm agency model, the preferences of the principal and agent are assumed
to be common knowledege. Second, the model assumes that the parties may condition the
obligations of either party on any performance measure that can be observed by both parties.
Thus the model assumes that contractual instruments conditioned on observables present
no interpretive problems and that fact-ﬁnding of any observable performance measure is
perfect. In practice, neither of these assumptions are satisﬁed. One branch of the literature
on contract relaxes these assumptions, and supposes that the relationship is characterized by
precisely deﬁned rules that govern the order in which individuals make decisions (see Laﬀont
and Tirole (1993) for an excellent review of models in this spirit).
This approach faces two practical diﬃculties. First, it is assumed that the Nash equi-
librium (or one of its reﬁnements) to the game is the predicted outcome. The equilibria to
a game, however, are very sensitive to small changes in the information structure. Given
17that these changes are typically not observed by outside parties means that, outside of a
laboratory, it is essentially impossible to empirically implement this class of models. Second,
a contract between two parties speciﬁes obligations, and payments that are to be made as
a function of decisions made by the parties. In other words a contract itself deﬁnes a game
in the sense it is used in economics. The careful modelling of this game choice can result in
extreme complexity. This problem may be one reason it has been so diﬃcult to narrow the
gap between the economic theory of contract and scholarship on contract law.
Rather than attempt to answer the question of what is the equilibrium for a particular
game, the theory of mechanism design begins with a primitive description of the environment
- the preferences of individuals, and information available to each party - and then asks what
are the allocation of resources possible with some game. This theory relates characteristics
of the individuals to a set of feasible allocations of resources, both of which are potentially
observable.
In this section we brieﬂy outline two generic results, and the implicit assumptions about
the legal system that underlie them. The ﬁrst set of results is based upon the theory of
Nash implementation. In these results, the two parties to the contract are well informed
about each other’s preferences and actions, but third parties (courts/government) cannot
necessarily observe this information. In the second set of results, each party has private
information that no other party, including the court, can observe.
3.2.1 Symmetric Information among the Parties and Nash Implementation
In the theory of Nash implementation, developed by Eric Maskin (1999) (this article is a
reprint of a working paper that was circulated in the 1970’s), the key feature of the exchange
environment speciﬁes an information structure in which, though the agents can observe each
other’s actions and preferences, the third-party enforcer cannot observe the preferences or
actions of the private agents. This model has helped clarify the conditions under which
eﬃcient allocations can be implemented in this environment.
The main issues can be illustrated with a simple team production problem. Suppose that
the preferences of the buyer and seller take the form:
uB = B(q;ib;is)   p   ib;
us = p   is;
18where q 2 f0;1g represents trade or not trade. Further suppose that B(0;ib;is) = 0, that
B(1;ib;is) is diﬀerentiable and that i
b;i
s > 0 solve:
maxib;isB(1;ib;is)   ib   is > 0:
Trade is eﬃcient when the parties take the optimal actions. Further suppose that the
payoﬀ B is observable, but that the actions are not observable outside the relationship. This
is a version of the team production problem studied by Holmström (1982). Suppose that
parties write a contractual instrument of the form p(B) - namely they agree how to share
the gain B: Holmstrom (1982) shows that in this case it is impossible to obtain an eﬃcient
allocation. It is easy to illustrate this under the hypothesis that p(:) is diﬀerentiable. Notice
that the conditions for the ﬁrst best are:
@B=@is = @B=@ib = 1;
yet under the contractual instrument p(B) parties select their actions to satisfy:
p
0(B)@B=@is = (1   p
0(B))@B=@ib = 1:
For the contractual instrument p(B) to implement the ﬁrst best we would need
p
0(B) = (1   p
0(B)) = 1;
which is clearly impossible.
Notice that these results rest on implicit models of the legal system. The courts can
perfectly ﬁnd all facts except the action of the agent, which is completely unobservable by
the court. Moreover, the contractual instrument is unambiguous; it presents no problems of
interpretation for the court. Finally, enforcement of the contract is costless and perfect.
Suppose that the parties can use a third-party to facilitate their exchange. Then it is
possible to create a mechanism that has the eﬃcient allocation as an equilibrium. The idea
is very simple. Let  = fib;isg, the actions of the two parties, be the state. The parties, but
not the court, can observe . Let p be a price at which both parties have strictly positive
gains if investment is eﬃcient. Let  represent the eﬃcient level of investment. Suppose
now that each party reports to a third party their observation of the state, say b and s
from the buyer and seller, respectively. The third party then announces the terms of trade
as required by the contractual instrument and the messages b and s.
19Consider the following contract:
q(s;b) =
(





p if (b;s) = 
0 if not
:
Note that, under this contract, it is a Nash equilibrium for both parties to tell the truth.
Moreover, given that there are strict gains from trade, it is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium in the two stage game in which they ﬁrst choose their actions and then simultaneously
send a message to the third-party regarding their observation of the state.
Notice that, oﬀ the equilibrium path, this mechanism enforces no trade even though
no trade is not eﬃcient. This feature is crucial, and a necessary condition for eﬃcient
implementation in many environments.27 Second, the eﬃcient allocation is not the only
Nash equilibrium. It is also an equilibrium of this game not to invest and to have no trade.28
Can a court play the role of the third party? Courts function ex post, after a dispute
arises. The mechanism, by contrast, requires the parties to send the third party a message
ex ante to determine the terms of trade. Courts do not serve this function; the mechanism
thus requires both a third party and a court that can perfectly observe the messages sent to
the third party and the actions of the two contracting parties. In addition, interpretation
must be unambiguous and enforcement costless and perfect.
An important theme in this literature is the role of bargaining power. Early papers
on the holdup model, such as Grout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1990), emphasize the
role that ex post bargaining power plays in creating incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc
investments. Aghion et al. (1994) make the point that mechanisms should be able to allocate
the bargaining power of agents. If it can do this, then they show that it is possible to
27A key ingredient in this class of models is the requirement that parties can implement an ineﬃcient
allocation in some states. If this is not possible then, as Maskin and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) show,
the set of feasible allocations may be limited. When it is possible to force an ineﬃcient allocation, Maskin and
Tirole (1999) have shown that one can drop the assumption that the good to be traded must be describable
in advance (see also Segal and Whinston (this volume)).
28The term Nash implementable means that the mechanism has a unique equilibrium. In this case, the
general results of Moore and Repullo (1988) can be used to show that, in exchange models such as this,
a mechanism exists that implements the eﬃcient allocation under the hypothesis that parties play a Nash
equilibrium (see Moore (1992) for an excellent review). A necessary condition for this result is that either: 1.
It is possible to implement an ineﬃcient allocation; or 2. If parties always renegotiate ineﬃcient allocations
ex post, then one requires the addition of an interested third party who receives a payment in the event of a
disagreement. This 3rd party eﬀectively makes is possible to punish both parties in the event of breach.
20implement the eﬃcient allocation. We shall return to this theme at various points in the
subsequent discussion as we may understand legal rules as devices that allocate bargaining
power between the party. Once the parties have entered a contract, the legal rules determine
the outside option available to the parties, should they choose not to perform.
3.2.2 Asymmetric Informaton
In many instances, the exchange environment features parties who have private information.
In this situation, the solution concept is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The seminal paper in
this literature, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), considers the problem of trading a single,
indivisible good, in which case the quality of the good, q 2 [0;1], represents the probability
that there is trade. Expected beneﬁt and costs are given by:
B (q;v) = q  v;
C (q;c) = q  c:
where v;c 2 [0;1] and are assumed to be uniformly distributed over this interval. In this




1 if v  c
0 if not
;
while price, given by p(v;c), has no restrictions.
We have two cases. Suppose ﬁrst that contract is possible before parties know their types
and binding contracts with liquidated payments are possible. Then, from D’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979), we know we can implement the ﬁrst-best with a budget balancing
mechanism. In this case, we consider a direct mechanism, that is a mechanism that requires
each party to reveal to the institution implementing the mechanism her private valuation,
denoted by ^ v and ^ c for the buyer and seller, respectively. The timing of the mechanism is as
follows:
1. The buyer and seller agree upon a mechanism.
2. Each learns her private valuation, v or c.
3. They report their values, ^ v and ^ c to the mechanism under the assumption that the
other party reports truthfully (namely ^ v = v and ^ c = c).
214. The mechanism determines the level of trade, q(^ v;^ c) and the transfer price, P(^ v;^ c):
This mechanism, like the mechanism of the prior section, requires a third party that is
distinct from a court as the third party must act ex ante to determine the terms of trade as
a function of the parties’ reports. To implement this mechanism, the reporting requirements
must be unambiguous – i.e., interpretation must be unproblematical, the court must be able
to costlessly and perfectly accurately observe the reports ^ v and ^ c, the level of trade, q(^ v;^ c)
and the transfer price, P(^ v;^ c):
In this example, the optimal allocation q(^ v;^ c) can be implemented with the price func-
tion:
P(^ v;^ c) = E fq
 (v;^ c)vj^ cg + E fq
 (^ v;c)cj^ vg +  p;
where  p is some constant that divides the rents between the two parties. To see that this
implements truth telling in equilibrium, consider the sellers expected proﬁts under the as-
sumption the buyer tells the truth. Let ^ c(c) be the seller’s reporting strategy given her costs
c. In this case her expected proﬁt, ignoring any terms that do not depend upon ^ c, are:
US(^ c(c)) = E fq
 (v;^ c(c))vj^ cg   E fq
 (v;^ c(c))cg + constant:
By construction, q(v;c) maximizes this expression, and hence it is optimal to set ^ c(c) = c.
29 Being untruthful simply means that an ineﬃcient level of trade is implemented, which,
by construction, makes her worst oﬀ. A similar argument applies to the buyer.
Note that the parties must agree upon this mechanism before they know their valuations.
If they learn their true values prior to negotiation over the mechanism, then, as Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) show, it is not in general possible to implement the ﬁrst best because
the incentive-compatible mechanism requires that, in some states, one party receive a payoﬀ
that is less than her ex ante gains from trade. If the parties learn their valuations before
negotiation, the mechanism must, in addition to being incentive-compatible, be individually
rational - each party must receive an amount that is at least as good as her outside option.
In this case, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that the ﬁrst best cannot be achieved
29A direct mechanism is called incentive compatible if it is an optimal strategy for each to report the
truth whenever they expect the other agent to be truthful. Moreover, the revelation principle (Dasgupta
et al. (1979) and Myerson (1979)) states that, for any other mechanism that one might construct, there
always exists an incentive compatible, direct mechanism that yields the same information. This result might
seem surprising at ﬁrst, but note that the institution implementing the mechanism is not a strategic player.
Any other mechanism involves agents playing equilibrium strategies that are a function of their private
information - these can be transformed into a direct mechanism by having the institution play the optimal
strategies on behalf of each agent, who then have an incentive to be truthful.
22in all cases.
The ineﬃciency result depends crucially upon two-sided asymmetric information. When
the exchange environment exhibits one-sided asymmetric information, we may again im-
plement the ﬁrst-best. When the seller’s cost is easy to verify, the following mechanism
implements the eﬃcient allocation:
1. Parties agree upon a ﬁxed payment,  p from buyer to seller that covers any ﬁxed costs
of production.
2. The seller’s cost c is revealed.
3. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it price p oﬀer to the seller.
4. Seller accepts or rejects the oﬀer.
5. If the seller rejects the oﬀer, the seller keeps  p and there is no production. If the seller
accepts, the seller produces, and is paid  p + p.
This mechanism again requires that interpretation be unambiguous, the relevant facts be
costlessly and perfectly found, and that enforcement is perfect.
This mechanism has a unique, perfect equilibrium, namely if the buyer’s valuation is
greater than the seller’s cost, then the buyer oﬀers a price equal to the seller’s cost (p = c)
and the seller produces. If not, the buyer oﬀers a 0 price and there is no production. This
strategy implements the eﬃcient allocation, and illustrates two points. First, asymmetric
information per se does not imply an ineﬃcient outcome. Second, eﬃciency is achieved with
an allocation of authority to the informed party. The importance of authority has already
been mentioned in the discussion of the holdup model above. This example illustrates that
the use of contract clauses in observed contractual instruments may exist to address problems
of holdup or asymmetric information, a point to which we return below.
There is also the case studied in Crémer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992)
that shows the importance of the independence assumption. If there is some correlation in
the valuations between the parties, and unlimited payments are possible, then the ﬁrst best
can be achieved. Here the assumption of unlimited sidepayments plays a crucial role. Levin
(2003) in the context of relational contracts, and MacLeod (2003) in context of a risk averse
agents, show that one can explain some features of observed contractual instruments with a
model that has both correlation and constraints on the size of possible side payments.
Thus, mechanism design with asymmetric information captures formally an important
transactions cost that arises when parties renegotiation terms. Williamson (1975) has long
23emphasized the role that “informational impactedness” plays in shaping observed institutions
(see Tadelis and Williamson (this volume) for a recent review). The mechanism design
literature pushes Williamson’s insight a bit further and allows us to conclude:
1. When there is two sided asymmetric information, and parties negotiate contract terms
after learning their private information, a cost is necessarily incurred; either there is
an ineﬃcient level of trade or there is a lengthy dispute (see Crampton (1985) for a
discussion of the relationship between the Myerson-Satthwaite model and bargaining
under asymmetric information).
2. When there is one sided asymmetric information, then the outcome is ineﬃcient if and
only if the uninformed party has the bargaining power during contract renegotiation
(see Gibbons (1987) and Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992)).
3. More generally, in the case of two sided asymmetric information the status quo or
bargaining default can aﬀect the eﬃciency of a relationship, as shown by Ayres and
Talley (1995) and McKelvey and Page (2002).
3.3 Incomplete Contracts
Almost every contractual instrument fails to specify an obligation in every possible state
of the world. Indeed, courts typically resolve disputes that arise when events occur that
are relevant to the relationship, but are not addressed in the contractual instrument. For
example, consider a paradigm supply example. Suppose a caterer contracts for the delivery of
fresh ﬁsh to a location for an event in the afternoon, at a agreed upon price p. The contractual
instrument is very simple; it requires the supplier to deliver by 3 pm, and emphasizes the
importance of timely delivery because the ﬁsh is for an important event. Now, suppose the
normally reliable supplier is involved in a traﬃc accident, and fails to deliver the ﬁsh which
results in irreparable harm to the caterer’s reputation for reliability.
The court must determine what damages, if any, should be assessed upon the supplier
for breaching the promise to deliver the ﬁsh. Our example presents a classic problem of
an incomplete contractual instrument. To an economist, the prevalence of these disputes
is puzzling because the parties surely understand that accidents sometimes happen. The
dispute does not arise from asymmetric information. As the accident was foreseen, why
haven’t the parties included terms in the agreement that cover such cases? A complete
contractual instrument would have clauses that specify payments that would be made when
24there is non-performance. In this sub-section we review the various models that have been
introduced to explain why contractual instruments are incomplete. In section 4 we discuss
the role of the law in completing such incomplete contractual instruments.
The role of the court and the law expands in the face of incomplete contractual instru-
ments. Most importantly, the court must determine what obligations the parties have when
an uncontracted-for event arises. In terms of our taxonomy of legal functions, interpretation
is no longer unambiguous. We review the sparse literature on interpretation in section 4.1.
In this section, we set the stage by cataloguing some reasons that the parties may write
incomplete contractual instruments.
3.3.1 Incomplete State Space
The statement that “a contract is incomplete” is in fact a rather crude and not particularly
helpful statement. After all, a simple rule of interpretation assures that every contractual
instrument is complete. Given any contractual instrument K, let Ec be the set of states for
which there is no speciﬁed obligation. If an event E  Ec occurs, then we can complete the
contractual instrument by supposing that neither party has an obligation in this event. As
one can always do this, one can always suppose, following Ayres and Gertner (1992), that
contracts are obligationally complete. Hence, for each contractual instrument, either parties
perform as speciﬁed in the agreement, or one party believes there is breach of contract, in
which case she has the right to adjudication.
The need for contractual instruments to require some form of adjudication has been
recognized if the formal economics literature since the seminal work of Simon (1951). This
paper can be viewed as the ﬁrst formal model in the economic theory of organization. Here
he is trying to explain why we need an organization with a manager and employee rather
than treating the employee as a market contractor who provides speciﬁed services at an
agreed upon price. His idea is that a market contract requires specifying the characteristics
of the good and it’s price ex ante. In practice, one often wishes to modify the characteristics
of a good after a contractual instrument has been signed. The idea here is that it is diﬃcult
to anticipate all the needs in advance, and hence one would like the right to unilaterally
modify the characteristics of the good supplied ex post.
He suggests that this is exactly what is achieved with an employment contract - the em-
ployee agrees to supply a variety of goods, the characteristics of which are determined only at
the time they are needed. Of course, the employee has to be compensated for the possibility
that she will be asked to supply a good that is more costly than was anticipated. This pos-
25sibility creates a trade-oﬀ - when the needs are predictable then a sales contract is optimal.
Where there is greater uncertainty, then an employment relationship is preferred. The model
is far from complete. However it highlights the importance of complexity for understand-
ing the choice between contract and organization (and explains why there is a chapter on
“Contracts between Legal Persons” in the Handbook of Organizational Economics). In other
words, understanding how contracts fail helps us better understand the role of organziations.
Deﬁning exactly what one means by “complex” remains an open question, or, more pre-
cisely, there are many deﬁnitions of complexity that depend upon the context. The formal
model of contract we describe above supposes that a contractual instrument is a collection
of event-obligation pairs. Events are subsets of the state space, which even for very simple
problems becomes astronomically large (see the discussions by Williamson (1975), chapter
2 and MacLeod (2002a)). This implies that even with small costs of adding clauses to a
contractual instrument, contractual instruments are likely to be very incomplete. This idea
is formalized in the work of Townsend (1979) and Dye (1985) in the context of a simple risk
sharing contract. They show that the ﬁxed costs of adding terms implies that there can be
only a ﬁnite number of events speciﬁed in any contractual instrument. Given that the state
space is inﬁnite, this implies that the ﬁrst best cannot be achieved. Rather then exogenously
ﬁxing the cost of a adding an event, Anderlini and Felli (1994) endogenizes these costs with a
model of computational complexity, and also show that the optimal contractual instrument
trades oﬀ the cost of planning costs against contractual completeness.
In terms to trying to identify how transactions costs constrain, or help us explain observed
contract form, this literature has not been very satisfactory because there is no obvious way
to measure complexity costs. Morever, this literature faces the following logical inconsistency.
It supposes that parties optimally choosing contract completeness by trading oﬀ the beneﬁt
against the cost of adding new contract terms. The diﬃculty is that one does not know the
beneﬁt from a new term until one explicitly explores the term, which by assumption is what
one is trying to avoid. This gives rise to what Day and Pingle (1991) call the impossibility
of “economizing economizing”.
One approach to this problem is to model complexity as follows. Suppose that ex ante
one knows that there are n ways to build a good, but ex post only one of these ways is
desirable. Complexity is then measured by n. In this environment Segal (1999) shows
that the optmal contractual instrument when n is large is a simple ﬁxed price contract.
Che and Hausch (1999) extend this result to the case in which parties make relationship
speciﬁc investments that aﬀect both parties’ payoﬀs. In both cases the optimal contractual
26instrument in a complex environment does not achieve the ﬁrst best. Evans (2008) shows
that in environments where it is possible to have multiple equilibria in the renegotiation
game an eﬃcent allocation is possible. (see Segal and Whinston (this volume) for a recent
review).
3.3.2 Search and Planning Costs
These models illustrate how a particular measure of complexity may lead to predictions
regarding observed contract form. However, as a basis for explaining observed contractual
instruments there remain a number of issues. First, it is not at all obvious how to measure or
think about complexity, nor is there an obvious way to count the number of possible events
or products. Second, all these models suppose a level of rationality that leave no signiﬁcant
role for the law. Many of the cases that arrive before the courts deal with mis-understandings
and errors of judgement by one or both parties to an agreement. Though Herbert Simon
long argued for the need to incorporate decision making errors into economics, the progress
has been slow.
One area where there has been a great deal of progress is in the use of search models
in economics. These models are not typically viewed as models of bounded rationality, yet
many models of artiﬁcial intelligence are based upon the search paradigm. Simon (1956)
makes this point beautifully where he introduces his famous notion of satisﬁcing. The basic
idea is that when one is deciding how many alternatives to consider before making a decision,
one continues until a threshold payoﬀ is reached. At that point search stops, and a decision
is reached. In the appendix to the paper he shows that this behavior can be viewed an an
optimal decision where the threshold is the value from continued search, When one ﬁnds an
alternative greater than this value, then it is optimal to stop.
In fact, if one applies Savage (1972) model of decision making to this problem, a person’s
satisfying payoﬀ can be viewed as her revealed expected future gain from search. In an
uncertain environment there may be no way to set such a value, and hence there is no way
to conclude than individuals who satisﬁce are not optimizing. Rothschild (1974) makes this
point formally, and shows that satisﬁcing behavior can be viewed as rational choice under
uncertainty. MacLeod (2002b) extends this idea to a model where an individual explicitly
builds a formal representation, that is subsequently used to make a decision. He shows that
the resulting model not only illustrates why planning is incomplete, but can be used to
explain the shape of observed learning curves.
In terms of contract formation, these models imply that rational individuals may still
27write contractual instruments that are not only incomplete, but also lead to outcomes that
may require the intervention of a third party. The formal integration of contract theory
with search begins with the Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Diamond and Maskin (1981).
The former paper explores the impact of default results upon search eﬃciency, while the
later illustrates how search creates externalities for other individuals in the market.Craswell
(1988) explicitly applies this idea to the problem contract formation.
The fact that search costs may lead to an incomplete contractual instrument does not
imply that observed contractual incompleteness is the result of bounded rationality. Ayres
and Gertner (1989) show that asymmetric information may lead to strategic incompleteness.
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) have extended this idea to the relational contract model.
Recently, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) have made the beautiful point that these search/planning
costs can be viewed as a form of relationship speciﬁc investment. We discuss the implications
of this insight for the law in the next section. Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2005) introduce
an explicit planning model and works out how these costs give rise to the incompleteness
of contractual instruments, while Tirole (2009) builds on these insights with a model of
contractual completeness under the assumption of enforceable agreements. He shows that
planning costs can result in relational contracts that are less complete than their one-shot
counterparts.
The basic message of this section is that there are eﬀectively three important transac-
tions costs that shape the form of observed contractual instruments. The ﬁrst of these is
asymmetric information - either between the two contracting parties or between the con-
tracting parties and the third party agent used to enforce the agreement. Second, there are
constraints on the the payments to individuasl that may arise either because they are wealth
constrained or because of risk aversion. Finally, contractual environments are complex in
the sense that parties have at best an incomplete model of how a relationship will evolve.
Hence there is always some need to have a mechanism in place to deal with the inevitable
disputes that arise. The recent literature has shown that one does not need to build a full
blow model of bounded rationality to attack this problem. Rather, a great deal of progress
can be made using the tools of search theory or the standard holdup model.
4 Contracting in the Shadow of the Law
In this section, we explore the interface between the economics of contract and the law
of contract and discuss some of the literature that lies at this interface. Legal analysis of
28contract focuses on contracting in the “shadow of the law”; the parties take into account how
the remedial actions of the court might aﬀect the ex ante design of contractual instruments.
The analysis thus starts with an inquiry into how a court will resolve various disputes that
might arise.
For the most, part the economics of contract ignores the eﬀect of the law upon contract
design. The genesis of contract theory is the canonical principal-agent model discussed above.
That model only requires a very elemental theory of law. First, it is assumed that each party
understands the preferences of the other, and hence both can anticipate how the other will
behave. As such, there is no unanticipated “breach.” Most importantly, the agency contract
speciﬁes not actions, but payments as a function of the events that occur during contract
execution. As long as these events are veriﬁable, then the only role of the court is to enforce
the transfer speciﬁed in the contract.
A common, if not ubiquitous, problem occurs when one party cannot aﬀord to make a
transfer required by a contract. In the case of agency theory, given that the state provides a
complete description of the environment, this constraint is anticipated and incorporated into
the design of the contractual instrument.30 This contract design ensures that, even in this
case, there is no real role for the courts because the transfers are always feasible. The issue
then is not a legal one per se, but one of contract design given this constraint. There is a vast
literature in corporate ﬁnance that explores the consequence for contract design when parties
face limited liability.31 These papers can be viewed as contributing to our understanding
of contracting in the shadow of the law, where the shadow is the rule that limits penalties
to the ﬁnancial wealth of defendants. This limitation was not always the case. In the past
debtors might be sent to prison or face other physical penalties. It is an open question why
there has been an historical evolution toward limiting liability to one assets. See Hansmann
(2010) in this volume for further discussion on the historical evolution of limits to ﬁnancial
liability.
We organize our discussion around the functional elements of contract law. Virtually
nothing has been written about the role of the court as a ﬁnder of facts in contract dis-
putes.32 Some attention has been given to questions of contract interpretation. The tradi-
30See Sappington (1983) and Innes (1990) for two early important contributions A party that cannot aﬀord
to pay a judgment is called “judgment-proof.” This term is normally used in the context of tort law, but can
also apply when a party cannot make good upon a promised payment by contract. See Lewis and Sappington
(1999) for a recent contribution and discussion of this literature.
31See Gale and Hellwig (1985) for an early important contribution. See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)
for a comprehensive review of this vast literature.
32A large literature exists on the fact-ﬁnding function generally but this literature, naturally, does not
29tional approach to the law and economics of contract, as beautifully reviewed in Hermalin
et al. (2006), examines the doctrinal elements of a contract action and asks how diﬀerent
remedies might inﬂuence contract design and contractual performance. The literature, how-
ever, tends not to focus upon the fact that the breach event is endogenous. As MacLeod
(2007) observes in a review of the literature on relational contracts, the speciﬁcation of the
breach event is a key determinant of the eﬃciency of a relational contract.
The rest of the section is divided into three parts. First, we discuss the small literature
on interpretation. The second subsection addresses the problem of breach design. Third,
we discuss what remedy is appropriate when breach occurs. Finally, we discuss contractual
instruments that use delegation and/or authority relationships. These are very common in
many commercial contracts. We show that these contractual instruments eﬀectively deter-
mine the performance obligation ex post - after the contractual instrument has been signed
and (some) uncertainty has been realized.
4.1 Contract Interpretation
Virtually all models in both the economics of contract and the economic analysis of contract
law make two critical assumptions about contractual behavior. First, the models assume that
contractual instrumentss are perfectly drafted: contractual instruments are clear and consis-
tent on their face. Second, the models assume that parties to the contract have foresight and
correctly anticipate the consequences of their actions, including those of the court. Neither
assumption is warranted; contractual instruments are inevitably unclear and often inconsis-
tent. They require interpretation. Moreover, the practice of interpretation is not completely
transparent. As the important paper by Goetz and Scott (1980) observes, courts have a
complex set of rules that often entail changing clearly speciﬁed performance obligations.
The economic theory of incomplete contracts does admit one important role for interpre-
tation. When an uncontracted-for event occurs, a court must ﬁll the gap in the incomplete
contractual instrument. The court must specify the obligations of the parties to determine
whether breach has occurred or not. The gap-ﬁlling ruling is often called a default rule. The
literature on the economic analysis of contract law has generally discussed these rules as a
device for reducing drafting costs. We discuss these rules in the second subsection.
Gap-ﬁlling, however, is not the sole purpose of interpretation. In the second subsection,
we discuss the sparse literature that adopts a more general approach to interpretation. As
noted in section 2.2, we can understand interpretation as a mapping from some set of inter-
address how the design of a contractual instrumentshould vary with the fact-ﬁnding capacities of a court.
30pretative materials that include the contractual instrument but may include other texts and
actions into a set of contractual obligations for each possible event.
4.1.1 Some Formalism
A bit of formalism will help clarify some of the conceptual issues in this theory. Here we use
a simpliﬁed version of Battigalli and Maggi (2002)’s model of contract. This model relies
upon the standard mathematical model of uncertainty which, as Savage (1972) observes,
makes a number of strong assumptions that we discuss in more detail below.
Battigalli and Maggi (2002) distinguish between external events relevant to a relationship
and the obligations that a contract imposes upon parties. Their notion of an event is built
up from primitive sentences, such as “it rains,” “there is an accident” or “the time is 3 pm.”
These then deﬁne events in the statistical sense.33 For example, the event
E = fthereisanaccidentontheGeorgeWashingtonBridgeat2pmg
is built up from these primitive ingredients deﬁning location, time and nature of the event.
One might have a delivery contract that says “Deliver the fresh ﬁsh by 3pm today to 230
Mercer Street, New York City. If event E or a similar event occurs, then one is excused from
timely delivery.”
In decision theory, a state always denotes a complete description of what has or will
occur in the world. From this perspective, an event E is a collection of states. Formally, the
event E corresponds to all possible states of the world that have an accident on the George
Washington Bridge at 2 pm. Each state in this event provides a complete description not
only of the past, but also of the possible future worlds.
Thus, a complete description of the world at date t is itself an event - namely all the
states that correspond to the observed history, and all possible future continuations of each
of these histories. The accumulation of knowledge corresponds to the reﬁnement of the states
that might be possible. For example, suppose that event E represents our current knowledge
- namely all the states that we believe are possible, then we know event E1 has occurred
with certainty if and only if E  E1: If we let Et describe an event that occurs at date t,
then necessarily for subsequent events, t0 > t we have Et0  Et.
With this formalism, we may deﬁne a contractual instrument, contractual behavior, and
enforcement behavior. These three deﬁnitions allow us to see the shape and role of law in
33See Savage (1972) for a deﬁnitive discussion of the formal model of decision making as used in economics.
31establishing a contract.
In the most basic sense, a contractual instrument can be viewed as a list of terms. A
term tjis a triple (Ej;ij;aj) where Ej is the event that triggers the expectation that agent
ij 2 fB;Sg(buyer or seller) will undertake an action chosen from the set aj  A(Ej), where
A(Ej) denotes the set of actions that are feasible at event Ej, and aj is a set of actions.
Two remarks about the set of “actions” may clarify the idea. First, contract terms are
often understood by lawyers in particular as imposing obligations. The idea of a set of
actions, however, is more general. Consider for example a contract that confers on B a
ninety-day (beginning, say on 1 June 2100) option to buy Whiteacre at a price p. B is under
no obligation to buy Whiteacre but our formalism nonetheless may capture this contract
term: let Ej = the universal set and let aj = fexercise; notexerciseg where “exercise”
means exercise the option prior to 29 August 2100.34
Second, the parties may describe the action set in at least two diﬀerent ways. They
might provide a list of tasks that the agent may perform. Or the parties may describe a
performance that the agent must accomplish. Our earlier example “Deliver the fresh ﬁsh by
3pm today to 230 Mercer Street, New York City.” uses a performance to describe the action
set; it does not list the multitude of ways that the agent might actually deliver the ﬁsh by
3 pm – by cart at 2:59, by bicycle at 2:58, etc.35 The manner of speciﬁcation may aﬀect the
interpretive task for the court.
We now turn to the parties’ contractual behavior in light of the contractual instrument
and the environment. We shall term this the execution of the contract. Execution - during
this period there is a ﬁnite sequence of events Eexecution = fE0  E1  :::  Eng, with the
interpretation that if Et  Ej (namely event Ej has occurred), then agent ij faces “obligation”
aj, she is “constrained” to choose from the actions in the set aj. We shall call the set Bj of
states in Ejin which ijchooses some action not in ajthe breach event.
We now turn to “enforcement”. Recall that each event Etincludes a description of the
actions taken by each party through time t. Consequently, the ﬁnal event of stage 2 En
characterizes what has happened during the execution of the contract. If one of the parties
believes that breach has occurred, she commences a law suit by identifying which term tk
the other party has breached by not selecting an admissible action. The plaintiﬀ must prove
that event Ekoccurred and that the other party did not take an action in ak. That is she
34Note that the option contract contains another term tk in which Ek = fjin , B exercised her option
to buy}
35Notice that these descriptions are incomplete. A complete description of the taks would identify the
route the deliveryman took and the type of cart or bicycle she might use.
32must show that En  Bj for some contract term kj. In that case, party i0
j 6= ij
36 may ask
a court of law to adjudicate and assess a transfer T = T court(K;En) from the buyer to the
seller (this will be negative if the buyer wins an award against the seller).37
Though this set-up appears very simple, it is a very complex model that, as we shall
show, captures many features of observed contractual instruments. Observe that there is no
need for a contractual instrument to specify an obligation for all events. If, for all terms,
Ej \En = ;, then the contractual instrument imposes no obligation. In addition, the model
formally deﬁnes what we mean by The Law: the law has costless and perfectly accurate fact
ﬁnding, costless interpretation that imposes the obligation literally (and unambiguously)
stated in the contractual instrument, and provides a remedy speciﬁed by the function T court
that determines damages as a function of what has occurred. Here we have placed no
restrictions on this function, and so we do not even have to assume the court observes all
the detail in En. A legal system ensures that such a function exists, though nothing in the
model implies that the parties know the function for all possible K:
Of course, we know that the law is not as clear-cut as the model speciﬁes. Facts are
diﬃcult to ﬁnd; contractual instruments impose obligations that are unclear, and the function
T court cannot be perfectly predicted. Lawyers help clients understand how the courts will
rule for diﬀerent contractual instruments K. A past case is a contractual instrument K; an
account of what happened, En and a ﬁnal ruling by the courts, T court(K;En). Past cases
provide insight into how the courts are likely to rule in the future.38 Legal scholarship on
contract law explores, among other things, ways to organize the law so we may better predict
how courts will rule in speciﬁc cases and new rules for the courts when it is felt that existing
rules are inadequate.
These considerations are for the most part missing in the economics literature because,
if one begins with the hypothesis that parties have a good and clear understanding of their
environment, then they can always, in principle, replace the court by terms that specify
the monetary transfers that they would want - terms called liquidated damages clauses.
Parties might consider breaching such an agreement, but under the assumption of perfect
36If En  Bj then this implies that party ij has breached, given the right to the other party, i0
j to bring
suit.
37For those unfamiliar with this notation, note that the notion of a state is very general in that the
event En will contain all the information regarding the sequence of actions that has occurred during this
relationship. It has been shown by Mertens and Zamir (1985) that this language is suﬃciently rich that it
can also incorporate believes of agents in a consistent fashion. A discussion of these issues if far beyond the
scope of the current review.
38We do not need to explicitly state the date here since that information is contained in En, as is the
information on K. We include K explicitly since it is the design variable we are interested in studying.
33enforceability the courts could be called upon to use their powers of seizure to ensure the
transfer.
In economics, the dividing line between contract theory and other areas of the theory of
organization such as corporate governance or human resource management, typically turns
on the notion that courts merely enforce the terms of a written agreement. In contrast,
corporate governance focuses upon the design of decison rights for oﬃcers of the corporation.
In fact, a legally binding contractual instrument must explicitly deal with the allocation of
decision rights over the relationship. That is, parties to a legally binding agreement provide
each other the right to take the other party to a court of law for the adjudication of the
contractual instrument in the event of a breach. In the absence of courts, parties would have
to rely upon other instruments to enforce an agreement, such as reputation eﬀects, or threats
to reduce trade in the future, or even possibly threats of violence (see MacLeod (2007) and
Malcomson (this volume)).
4.1.2 Default Rules
A default rule determines the obligations of the parties when an event occurs about which
the contractual instrument is “silent.” To reach this conclusion, of course, the court must
ﬁrst interpret the contractual instrument as not having addressed the realized event. A
prominent view is that courts should ﬁll in gaps using so called “majoritarian defaults”.
Under a majoritarian default rule, the court supplies the term that the majority of individuals
would prefer. Economic analysts of contract law justify this choice on the grounds that it
minimizes drafting costs. (Goetz and Scott (1983)). Given that the majority of contracts
are not litigated, it is not at all obvious that such a notion is well deﬁned or knowable to
contracting parties.
Even knowable, the determination of the optimal default rule ex post is challenging.
Mechanism design theory, outlined above (section 3.2), reveals the inherent tension between
ex post and ex ante eﬃciency. The implementation of ex ante eﬃcient contracts often
entails the use of actions that are sometimes ex post ineﬃcient. If an event occurs that
is not addressed in the contractual instrument, how does one tell if it is a foreseen event
that parties have delegated to the courts to ﬁll, or one that is unforeseen? If the event is
unforeseen then, as Hart (1990) observes, the consequences upon reaching that state can have
no eﬀect upon ex ante decisions. In that case, the eﬃcient rule is always to choose an ex post
eﬃcient allocation. As we have discussed above, a deﬁning feature of expectation damages
is that it is an attempt to achieve ex post eﬃciency. Hence, though the rule of expectation
34damages does not necessarily achieve ex ante eﬃciency, the fact that is approximates an ex
post eﬃcient allocation makes it an appropriate rule for unforeseen gaps in a contractual
instrument.
Ayres and Gertner (1989, 1992) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) argued that, in con-
tractual environments with asymmetric information, courts should adopt a “penalty” default
that induces the informed party to reveal her private information. These papers consider
models with two types of buyers, and for which the optimal level of seller’s investment is a
function of the buyer’s type. The buyer’s type is assumed to be private information. The
authors show that a default rule that “penalized” buyers with a high type would, under
the appropriate circumstances, induce high type buyers to reveal their type. This model,
however, failed to clearly distinguish penalty from majoritarian defaults. If low type buyers
constituted a majority of the buyer population, then they would be indiﬀerent between the
two rules considered by the court.
4.1.3 Interpretation Generally
The focus on default rules arises naturally in a world in which contracting parties are fully
rational and have perfect foresight. Interpretation will play a larger role in worlds where
agents err and draft defective contractual instruments. Several defects may arise. To catalog
these defects, we use the notation presented in section 3.4:
1. Ambiguous terms: an event E occurred with E \ Ej 6= ?andE * Ej so one does not
know if Ej has occurred or not.
2. Inconsistent terms: there are two clauses ki;kj with the feature that E  Ei \ Ej, yet
ai 6= aj. That is if event E occurs, it is not clear which action ai or aj should be carried
out. For example, the quantity of a good to be delivered may be ambiguous.
3. Impossible terms: for clause ki action ai = 2 A(Ei), namely when event Ei occurs action
ai is not feasible. This is a very common case for simple contractual instruments, such
as an agreement to supply q at a price p: Events may make it impossible to supply q:
Each of these defects present an interpretive problem for the court. As economic models
typically assume that the model parties use is an accurate representation of their relationship,
these defects cannot occur. As a consequence, though there is a substantial amount of
law arising from these three contractual defects, there is little economic analysis of these
problems.
35Even within the limits of perfectly foresighted parties, optimal interpretation requires
more than simply ﬁlling gaps. Shavell (2007) formalizes interpretation as a function from
the set of contractual instruments into itself. An interpretive method takes the contractual
instrument – a list of pairs of events and obligations – into another list of (event, obligation)
pairs.39
To understand the role of interpretation, we must consider the drafting options available
to the parties. Consider some state . The parties may draft a speciﬁc term that speciﬁes
obligations for  only; they may draft a general term that speciﬁes obligations for some event
E with  2 E, or the parties may ignore  and leave a gap in the contractual instrument.
Both gaps and general terms arise because it is costly to draft a term.
Shavell proves that the optimal method of interpretation has several properties: (1)
speciﬁc terms are enforced literally; (2) gaps are ﬁlled with “majoritarian” defaults, and (3)
general terms are, in some cases, overridden; the majoritarian default rule may be applied
to some  2 E: These results hold for a wide class of contractual environments. There are,
however, several caveats. First, there is no renegotiation. Second, there is perfect contract
enforcement. Finally, the economic problem is considered in reduced form.
4.2 Obligation and Breach
Courts do not automatically enforce contracts, rather the party harmed by non-performance
invokes the court. As such, legal enforcement is more properly viewed as providing parties
with a set of decision rights. This idea has it origin in Aghion and Bolton (1992). They
observe that bankruptcy can be viewed as a situation in which the control rights to a ﬁrm
moves from the owners to the debt holders. Similarly, MacLeod (2007) observes that contract
breach can be viewed as providing the harmed party the right to seek damages in a court of
law.
Contract law determines the remedy available to an aggrieved party; the parties, through
the contract design, assign the right to invoke the court for non-performance. We can
illustrate the problem with a version of the simple buyer seller example. We also use this
example to discuss remedies for contract breach.
Consider a buyer seller relationship where the seller chooses a level of eﬀort/quality q > 0
that determines the probability (q;E) that there has been performance as a function of q,
39As Shavell observes, and as we noted in section 2.2 above, an interpretive method might take more than
the text of the contractual instrument as its domain; the court might refer to additional texts and actions
to determine the obligations of the parties.
36and possibly other events E that occur after q is chosen (the model here is a simpliﬁed
version of the model in MacLeod (2007)). Let BP be the ex ante beneﬁt from performance,
and BB the ex ante beneﬁt if there is breach, and c(q) the cost to the seller of performing
(c(0) = 0;c0;c00 > 0). Given a price p, the payoﬀs to the buyer and seller are:
UB(q) = BP(q;E) + BB(1   (q;E))   rB   p;
US(q) = p   c(q)   rS:
The terms rS;rB  0 are the reliance expenditures by the buyer and seller. These provide
the motivation for writing a contractual instrument. After the contractual instrument has
been signed, but before trade and production, the buyer and seller make relationship spe-
ciﬁc investments, rB and rS respectively. As we discussed in the section on holdup, these
investments provide a motivation for writing a contract.
In addition to protecting investments, the contract must also provide appropriate incen-






Suppose that the buyer cannot directly observe eﬀort q; in which case we have a model that
is technically identical to a principal agent model with risk neutral agents, and hence, from
a contract theory perspective, this is a trivial problem. We suppose that it is eﬃcient to
trade, and hence any state contingent price is of the form:
ps = Bs   R; s 2 fP;Bg
eﬀectively shifts all the risk to the seller, and thus induces the seller to choose the eﬃcient
level of eﬀort. The term R is the rent that the buyer obtains from the relationship. It would
be set as a function of the relative ex ante bargaining power of the two parties.40
However, this contractual instrument is not a legal document - it merely speciﬁes the
transfers as a function of S’s decision to perform. It supposes either a costless legal system,
or a world where individuals do not breach upon their obligations. In practice there are a
number of ways in which this agreement could be implemented.
There are two contractual instruments of simple exchange which we denote by pA and
pP. In the ﬁrst case, pA deﬁnes the price that a buyers pays in advance in exchange for a
40Under this contract we have: UB = R   rB and US = BP(q;E) + BB(1   (q;E))   R   rS   c(q).
37promise by the seller to deliver a good that conforms to the contract speciﬁcations. The
second contract, pP is the price that the buyer promises to pay the seller upon delivery of a
conforming good. Notice that neither contractual instrument is complete in the sense that
neither speciﬁes what will happen in the event of breach. Nevertheless, these contractual
instruments that provide for simple exchange are very common and courts are expected to
be able to adjudicate the disputes that arise in these cases.
Notice that, though these are very simple contractual instruments, they have quite dif-
ferent properties when viewed as resource allocation mechanisms. In the case of instrument
pA, the buyer has paid, and hence the performance obligation rests in the hands of the seller.
If she does not perform, then the buyer must sue and must take care to collect evidence re-
garding the seller’s performance. Thus it is the buyer who must make the investment to sue.
If the seller can be shown not to perform, then the courts must determine the appropriate
damages.
In the case of instrument pP the situation is reversed. In this case, once the seller has
performed, the buyer must perform her promise to pay. If not, then the seller would have to
sue the buyer to collect the amount due. Note that, in the second case, once performance
has been veriﬁed, then the question of damages is straightforward - the buyer is obliged to
pay the amount agreed upon, plus possibly any expenses arising from the delay in payment.
We will use these two generic contractual instruments to discuss the various remedies for
breach of contract that have been proposed by the literature.
4.3 Remedies for Contract Breach
4.3.1 Relational Contracts
Before we discuss court enforced remedies it is useful brieﬂy to discuss relational contracts
(see Malcomson (2010) for a detailed review of the literature). These contracts use the
threat to terminate a relationship as a contract enforcement device. In a classic study
Macaulay (1963) observed that many business relationships appear to work well, even though
they have no formal contract, or the contractual instrument they have is extremely un-
clear/inconsistent.41 The evidence in Macaulay (1963) suggests that parties performed be-
cause of the expectation of future business.42
41This can occur when buyer and sellers use their own forms for purchase orders and invoice that include
boiler plate terms. This leads to the famous “battle of the forms” problem in contract law. See 3.21 in
Farnsworth (1999).
42See also Posner (1997) for a discussion of the role of norms, and how they may shape behavior in
contractual relationships
38The formal analysis of relational contracts begins with Telser (1980) who introduced the
idea that a relational contract can be modeled as a repeated game. He shows that if both
parties have suﬃcient gains from trade then, when the consequence of non-performance is
a cessation of trade, they will both perform. In his model, it is assumed that both parties
might breach the contract, and that this event is observable by both parties. Though Telser
does not use all the formalism of repeated game theory, his analysis is consistent with the
analysis of Abreu (1988).
Abreu shows that one can characterize all equilibria in a repeated game as a two step
procedure. First, parties agree upon the equilibrium action in each period. In the context of
a contract, this can be viewed as specifying the performance obligations. Next, Abreu shows
that this “agreement” can be the outcome of playing a sub-game perfect equilibrium if, in
every period, parties cannot gain by not performing, and then playing the worst subgame
perfect equilibrium for the cheater. In other words, when breach occurs, the non-performing
party faces the worst punishment possible under the rules of the game.
In this framework, the eﬃciency of an agreement is constrained by the size of the possible
punishment. The folk theorem formalized the idea that as the frequency of interaction is
increased - namely in each period there are more transactions, each of which of smaller value -
then eventually the gain from cheating is less than the cost, and hence an eﬃcient agreement
can be reached. Crucially, breach can be perfectly observed. One might wonder whether
the set of allocations depends upon the allocation of the cost of cheating between the two
parties. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) showed that only the total gains from future trade
aﬀect the set of feasible allocations. By carefully designing the breach obligation, combined
with a bonus payment by the buyer to the seller at the end of each period, parties can choose
any allocation of the surplus.
When there is uncertainty regarding performance, the problem is much more complex.
This corresponds to the case for which it may not be optimal for one party always to perform,
namely (q;E) < 1. In this case, it is no longer optimal for the breaching party to face the
maximal penalty. The modern theory of relational contracts explores the interplay between
uncertainty regarding the breach obligation, and the possible punishments available in a
relationship (see MacLeod (2007) for a review). In summary, the main technical diﬀerence
between the theory of damages under relational contracts and damages under contractual
instruments in the shadow of the law is that the maximal punishment under a relational
contract is limited. The insights of the contract design and damages literature also apply to
relational contract whenever the gains from trade are suﬃciently large.
39Before proceeding to our discussion of damages, it is worth while discussing two papers
that are often cited as examples of relational contracting, namely Klein and Leﬄer (1981)
and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). These papers do not explicitly address the question of what
is an optimal contract. Rather they begin with an observed contract form, and then ask what
are the market implications if parties restrict themselves to this contractual instrument. In
the case of Klein and Leﬀer (1981) they consider the simple sales contract: seller sells a good
at a ﬁxed price. They then suppose that product quality is potentially imperfect, and that
the market can observe product quality in the past. They then explore the consequences
for a competitive market when buyers shun sellers who have produced low quality in the
past. They show that this shunning strategy implies that high quality sellers will have brand
names with positive rents associated with them. Sellers will choose not to supply low quality
for fear of losing the return on their brand name.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) assume that ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁxed wage contracts, but have the
ability to dismiss workers at will. When there is uncertainty regarding worker performance,
or a delay in observing performance, then under such a contract employed workers must
earn higher utility than newly unemployed workers (and hence there is involuntary unem-
ployment). As MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show, involuntary unemployment follows
from the assumption on contract form, and not from the assumption of costly monitoring
(see Carmichael (1989) for an excellent discussion of the issues). These papers illustrate
an important branch of the literature that explores the properties of observed contractual
instruments, and how features of the contractual instrument (mainly the price) vary with
characteristics of the environment (see the chapter by Lafontaine and Slade (2010)). For the
most part, it is still an open empirical question why some contract forms are chosen rather
than others.
4.3.2 Speciﬁc Performance
The economics of contract for the most part assumes that the courts use the rule of speciﬁc
performance. This rule requires the promisor (the party in default) to perform. Suppose,
in our simple sales example, that the Seller fails to deliver the good. Consider speciﬁc
performance in the context of the sales contract given by pP at which the buyer promises
to pay pP upon delivery of the good. If Seller delivers and Buyer fails to pay, speciﬁc
performance merely requires the payment of a sum of money, a task that the courts are
competent to do. Notice that the ﬁrst best can be achieve with a price pP = BP whenever
(q;E)pP  c(q):
40Now consider the contractual instrument pA, where the seller promises to deliver a good
after payment has been made. Suppose Seller fails to deliver or delivers a good that is not
of the appropriate quality. The courts cannot directly control the actions of the seller, and
hence the best it can do is to provide the incentive for the party to perform. Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996) observes that the enforcement of speciﬁc performance entails the threat
of penalties that ensure that the parties perform as promised, which may entail holding one
party in contempt of court.43 If it is the case that, at the eﬀort q, one has (q;E) = 1,
then any penalty greater than US(q)   US(0) = c(q) would ensure performance. As Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996) observe, this makes the rule easy to implement in practice because
the courts need only verify there was no performance, and then impose a suﬃciently large
penalty. They then provide conditions under which speciﬁc performance can ensure eﬃcient
investment and trade, signiﬁcantly extending the earlier results of Rogerson (1984) and
Shavell (1984).
Notice that, if parties correctly anticipate the penalty from breach, then they would
never choose to breach. As contract litigation does in fact occur, for most exchanges there
are likely to be events that make performance diﬃcult to carry out, and hence in practice we
should expect (q;E) < 1. In this case, a large penalty would result in the seller choosing
eﬀort that is too high. In these cases, speciﬁc performance would not achieve the ﬁrst best.
The doctrine of speciﬁc performance in usually restricted to cases involving transfers of
property (or other “unique” goods). Here the courts are not involved in enforcing an action,
as much as enforcing an allocation of property. In other case the standard legal rule is to
set damages to the expect value of the breach to the harmed party.
4.3.3 Expectation Damages
The rule of expectation damages attempts to measure the loss arising from breach of contract.
In case of contractual instrument pB, if the buyer does not pay, the loss to the seller is pB, and
hence, in this case, expectation damages provides the same remedy as speciﬁc performance.
In the case of contract pA if the seller performs, the buyer obtain a return Bp, and a return
of BB if there is breach. The loss due to breach would be D = BP  BB. As we can see from
1, this rule ensures that the seller has an incentive to choose eﬀort eﬃciently. Crocker and
Masten (1988) provides some evidence that in the case of long term gas contracts parties
prefer expectation damages as a way of ensuring eﬃcient ex post adaptation to changing
conditions.
43See Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), page 482.
41The rule also provides an incentive for eﬃcient matching. For example, suppose that the
seller has another buyer of a good for whom the value is B0 > BP. If the seller breaches, she
would have to pay the buyer Bp, but sell the good for B0, for a gain for B0   BP. Thus she
would breach whenever it is eﬃcient to do so.44 However, as Schwartz (1979) observes, this
well-known argument does not necessarily imply that speciﬁc performance is ineﬃcient. In
the absence of transactions costs, the seller could always renegotiate the contract to share
some of the gains from breach with the buyer.45 In practice this argument is problematic
because parties are unlikely to be truthful regarding their valuations, and hence, as discussed
in section 3.2 such renegotiation is not likely to be eﬃcient.46
The early literature on damage rules (Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984)) observed that
even though expectation damages result in eﬃcient breach, it may not provide appropriate
incentives for relationship-speciﬁc investments, a theme that was later developed in the
property rights approach on the theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart (1986)). In light
of the subsequent literature showing that it is possible to write an eﬃcient contractual
instrument, the puzzle is why parties did not include speciﬁc terms to deal with defects? As
we have discussed above, if a contractual instrument speciﬁes monetary damages, then the
setting of damages is straightforward since speciﬁc performance and expectation damages
yield the same remedy for a price term - namely enforce the transfer speciﬁed in the contract.
The literature oﬀers two distinct reasons for such incompleteness of contractual instru-
ments. The ﬁrst is that contractual instrments are intentionally incomplete. Shavell (1984),
building on the insights of Goetz and Scott (1980), suggests that if breach is a very low
probability event then parties may ﬁnd that the ex ante cost of negotiating breach terms is
greater than the beneﬁt. In this case, they choose to delegate the damage decision to the
court. In these cases they would like to court to set damages equal to the amount they would
have agreed upon ex ante. Beginning with Townsend (1979), a literature explores the struc-
ture of optimal contractual instruments when there are costs to adding contingencies. Dye
(1985) show that optimal insurance contracts will entail some pooling over events. Anderlini
and Felli (1994) and Anderlini and Felli (1999) provide a theory of contract incompleteness
based upon the computational cost of describing an event. Battigalli and Maggi (2002)
extend this work and discuss how contract complexity aﬀect the choice of contract terms -
44See Hermalin et al. (2006), section 5.2 for discussion of this well known result as well as a more compre-
hensive review of the literature on expectation damages, and related measures of damages.
45Alternatively, the second buyer could purchase from the original buyer.
46See Ayres and Talley (1995) for a beautiful study of how the choice of default rule can aﬀect the eﬃciency
of renegotiation when there is asymmetric information.
42whether they are rigid or ﬂexible.
A number of papers show that parties may strategically choose incomplete contractual
instruments. Ayres and Gertner (1989), Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Spier (1992) show
that a buyer may not work to add a terms for damages fearing that it will reveal how much
he values the good. The seller could use this information to increase the price. Hermalin and
Katz (1993) suggest that courts should allow parties to use “ﬁll in the blank” contractual
instruments to enhance performance.
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that that parties may choose to leave contractual
instruments incomplete because this will increase the future gains from trade, and thus in-
crease the set of outcomes that can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibria. This allows
the parties to place more reliance upon the value of a future relationship for enforcement,
and thereby avoid costly enforement via a court. Scott (2003) provides some evidence from
case law that is consistent with the results of Bernheim and Whinston (1998), namely parties
do seem use contract incompleteness to enhance the set of feasible allocations. Baker et al.
(1994) have what can be viewed as a countervailing result. Namely, they show that if one
adds some legally binding performance clauses then this can increase the set of self-enforcing
agreements. Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) provide an interesting result. Namely, when one
party breaches a relational contract, then, rather than separate, the parties might choose to
use a contractual instrument that is enforceable in court. This would reduce the cost from
breaching and thereby reduce the set of contracts enforceable with a relational contract. See
MacLeod (2007) for further discussion of these points.
Before proceeding to the next section, it is worthwhile discussing the role that liquidated
damages play. Under contractual instrument pA the seller promises to perform, otherwise
there is a breach of contract. Agency theory would predict that in this case parties would
use a contingent contract - namely a price if there is performance, and if there is there is
non-performance the seller would pay to the buyer a penalty BP   BB that would ensure
eﬃcient eﬀort. Under such a contractual instrument, the delivery of non-conforming goods
would not be a breach of contract, but rather it would be the non-payment of the penalty
that would result in a breach of contract. In this case, whether one uses speciﬁc performance
or expectation damages as the default rule, the remedy for breach (non-payment) would be
simply the requirement that the penalty be paid.
In the economics literature, this is sometimes interpreted to mean that parties have spec-
iﬁed liquidated damages - the amount that the seller should pay if there is non-performance.
However, these are two quite diﬀerent contractual instruments. A liquidated damages clause
43speciﬁes a payment by the seller if there is breach - if the seller supplies the non-performing
goods the buyer could sue in court for the amount speciﬁed by the liquidated damages. The
court can, if it chooses, use the liquidated damage clause to assess damages. However, it not
required to do this. If the court feels that damages are excessive, it can reduce them or not
impose any at all. To many commentators, the discretion allowed to the courts is excessive.
Note that parties might choose liquidated damages over a two part tariﬀ precisely because
the court can use information that was not known or foreseen at the time the parties signed
their contractual instrument.
The penalty doctrine allows courts to reduce or waive liquidated damages that they feel
are excessive.47 This rule can be used to explain some features of observed contractual
instruments. A good example of this are long term contracts for inputs to a manufacturing
process. Joskow (1988) describes in some detail the market for the supply of coal to electric
utilities. If parties are risk neutral, then in principle they could agree to terms that might
allow the contract price for coal to vary signiﬁcantly from the spot price. An interesting
feature of observed contract prices is that they closely follow the spot price for coal. This
raises the question of why don’t parties use the spot price, rather than engage in costly
contract design? MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) provide a solution to this problem. As we
discussed above, if each party needs to make a relationship speciﬁc investment that aﬀects
their own payoﬀs, but not the other’s (the so called self investment case), then it is eﬃcient
to have a ﬁxed price contract. However, over time the price of coal can ﬂuctuate a great
deal. Parties could put into place large penalties to enforce trade at the contract price, but
these may not be enforceable under the penalty doctrine. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)
show that if parties can index the contractual instruments so that it follows the market price,
then it is unnecessary to put into place penalties for breach of contract, and moreover parties
would still have the incentive to make eﬃcient investments into relationship speciﬁc capital
because their investments do not aﬀect the price paid or received in the future.
4.3.4 Unforeseen Events
The evaluation of diﬀerent legal rules in the face of unforeseen events is challenging because
it is not clear how one should model such events. In the models of incomplete contracts
discussed above the parties perceived all the possible future events, but found it too costly
to incorporate these events into a formal contract.
47See Posner and Rosenﬁeld (1977) for an early analysis of these issues.
44Bajari and Tadelis (2001) introduce a simple and elegant way to formally introduce
unforeseen events into a model of construction contracts. The idea is that the time and
money spent drafting a contract can be viewed as relationship speciﬁc investment into the
quality of the contractual instrument. Let I be the investment into planning, and let (I)
be the probability that only foreseen events occur. It is assumed that 0 > 0, and hence the
quality of planning increases with I: With probability 1   (I) an unforeseen event occurs.
They then compare two contract forms - ﬁxed price and cost plus. Under a ﬁxed price
contract the seller is responsible for delivering an acceptable product at the agreed upon
price. This implies that the seller receives all the returns from any cost saving actions.
In contrast, under a cost plus contract, the buyer pays all costs of production, thereby
reducing the incentives to the seller of making unobserved cost-reducing investments. If
all events are foreseeable, then the ﬁxed price contract implements the ﬁrst-best, while if
no event is foreseeable, then the cost plus contract is more eﬃcient. Thus, if the cost of
planning are suﬃciently low that unforeseen events occur with low probability, then a ﬁxed
price contract is optimal, and vice versa with respect to cost plus contracts. The model
delivers a theory of contract form as a function of the complexity of the environment, as
measured by the cost of planning.
Tirole (2009) interprets the cost of planning as a form of limited cognition, and then
explores the consequence of planning costs/limited cognition upon contract design. He shows
that given that one can hide one’s information, then the introduction of limited cognition
can lead to adverse selection, as in the model of Spier (1992). Second, he showed that
contractual instruments may be too complete and that parties focus upon adding terms that
protect them from adverse consequences. He also shows that ex ante competition need not
reduce transactions costs. In summary, this paper explores how planning costs and limited
cognition constrain the optimal contract. Both of these papers follow the norms of agency
theory and do not introduce law an a potential constraint.
This question is addressed in Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009). They begin with the
structure of the American Institute of Architects form construction contracts. This class of
contractual instruments is interesting because they are widely used in the US construction
industry, and have evolved over 100 years in response to both experience in the ﬁeld and the
outcome of litigation involving construction disputes. Hence these contractual instruments
are likely to satisfy the economists’ assumption that the form of observed contractual in-
struments can be explained as an eﬃcient to solution to the problem of implementing trade
given transactions costs and the characteristics of the contracting parties. Chakravarty and
45MacLeod (2009) show that these contracts can indeed be viewed as eﬃcient under the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. The buyer’s design is costly in the sense of Bajari and Tadelis (2001).
2. The seller’s investment in cost reduction is not observable, though realized costs are
observable.
3. Buyer’s preferences are private information, and they can change between the time of
contract and project implementation.
4. Courts use expectation damages, but may excuse performance.
In practice construction must occur in the shadow of the law, and it is natural to ask if
eﬃcient trade is possible within existing law. The literature on mechanism design reviewed
above suggests that speciﬁc performance may be a necessary ingredient for eﬃcient trade.
Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) ﬁnd that this is not the case - these contractual instru-
ments are able to implement the eﬃcient allocation with a generalized version of expectation
damages:
Damages = Foreseeability  Expectation;
where Foreseeability is a number between 0 (unforeseen) and 1 (perfectly foreseen) rep-
resenting the extent to which a lost is anticipated. If an event is unforeeseable, and/or
impractical, then the law excuses the breaching party from performance. On the other
hand, if the event is foreseen, then the rule of expectation damages applies. Both of these
extremes are consistent with current law. The rule is more general because, when an event
is only partially foreseeable, then damages should be reduced. This rule is implemented in
the AIA forms by leaving the damages in some cases to be determined by mutual consent.
One of the more interesting features of the AIA contract is the extensive use made
of delegation. For example, the buyer has full control over ex post characteristics of the
building. For example, suppose that the contract calls for the painting of a house blue,
but at a later point the buyer decides that she really hates blue, and would like a white
house. Models of incomplete contractual instruments, such as Hart and Moore (1988) and
Aghion et al. (1994), suppose that the default during renegotiation is a blue house. Namely,
if renegotiation failed, then the contractual instrument would result in a blue house. This
default would allow the seller to extract a fraction of the diﬀerence in value between a white
and blue house. In contrast, under the AIA contract (and in fact under the US common
law) should the buyer tell the seller to paint the house white the seller has an obligation to
46use white paint. At the point the only obligation to the buyer is to compensated the seller
for any out of pocket costs resulting from the change in contract terms.
In construction it is common, if not ubiquitous, for there to be changes in plans after
a contract has been signed. The AIA form contracts address the problem by allowing the
buyer to create new obligations ex post. The next section address this issue in more detail.
4.4 Authority: Creating an obligation ex post
Lafontaine and Slade (2010) observe that it is very common for contractual instruments
to include an allocation of control rights or authority. In this section, we discuss some of
the literature that explores the reason for such a contractual instrument. There will be
essentially three reasons for the allocation of authority to one party or another, namely
unforeseen or costly to foresee contingencies, asymmetric information and the allocation of
ex post bargaining power.
The ﬁrst formal model of authority, indeed the ﬁrst modern contract model, is due to
Simon (1951).48 He considered a model in which parties sign a contractual instrument, the
buyer learns the state of nature, and then the level of output that the seller is to provide the
buyer is determined. Formally the optimal allocation fq(x);pg solves:
maxfq(x);pg EfB(x;q(x))g   p
subjectto :
p   EfC(q(x))g  u0
where x is a random variable, c(q) is the cost of producing q, B(x;q) the beneﬁt of q in state
x, p is the price and u0 is the sellers outside option. Simon (1951) supposes that x is not
contractible and known only to the buyer. Hence, the buyer is constrained to choose between
two contractual instruments. The ﬁrst is a sales contract where price p and quantity q are
set in advance. The second is an employment contract. This is a contractlual instrument in
which the seller (employee) agrees to supply any amount in a set Q at a price p. The beneﬁt
of this contractual instrument is that the buyer can adjust q as a function of information
received after the contractual instrument is signed. Here Simon has in mind an elemental
theory of bounded rationality that is captured by the hypothesis that x cannot be explicitly
contracted upon - a theme that the profession would not explore again until the 1980s. The
48In this section the focus is upon contractual instruments with authority. Notions of authority and control
are also central to the theory of the ﬁrm - see Gibbons (2005).
47main result is that when uncertainty is suﬃciently important (variance of x suﬃciently large)
then the employment contract is most eﬃcient, otherwise parties will use a sales contract.
In terms of enforcement, notice that the employment contract has two elements. First,
the buyer, after observing x, creates a performance obligation, q(x) for the seller. If the
seller does not perform, then the seller has breached. In employment relationships, such
breach does not typically lead to damages, but to the dismissal of the employee. Thus,
the employment contract is enforceable only to the extent that dismissal is a suﬃciently
large penalty. A second element to the contractual instrument, namely the requirement that
q(x) 2 Q, might be enforced by requiring that the seller can only be dismissed with just
cause. If the employer asks for an action outside of the set Q; then the seller has a right to
refuse to carry out such actions.
An obvious application of the model is to the theory of the ﬁrm - namely a theory that
predicts when contracts are within the ﬁrm and when they are between ﬁrms. Alchian and
Demsetz (1972) argued that Simon’s employment contract could not be construed as an
explanation for why we have ﬁrms. They observed that the buyer and seller are free to
reach any agreement they wish, and should circumstances change the contract terms can be
renegotiated. Thus, as MacLeod (2002a) shows formally, the introduction of renegotiation
ensures that Simon’s sales contract can always achieve the ﬁrst best. This result suggests
that, for a complete model of authority, one needs to add an additional ingredient. One such
ingredient is asymmetric information.
There are two ways in which asymmetric information may lead to an allocation of au-
thority rights. The ﬁrst of these has its roots in Williamson (1975)’s idea that contractual
relations are plagued by ex post opportunistic behavior that leads to costly contract renego-
tiation. These costs are formally captured in the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) model.
If there is two sided asymmetric information, and one is not sure if it is eﬃcient to trade,
then it is not possible to implement the eﬃcient allocation. A corollary of this result is that,
if there is one-side asymmetric information, then it is possible to achieve an eﬃcient allo-
cation. This point is reﬂected in standard construction contracts. They place an obligation
upon the seller to keep track of costs. This obligation makes sense because it is much easier
to measure costs than it is to measures a buyer’s valuation of a design trade. Chakravarty
and MacLeod (2009) note that this observation is consistent with the standard clauses in
AIA form contracts that allocate authority for design changes to the buyer, while requiring
the buyer to compensate the seller for any measured out of pocket costs arising from the
change. This rule ensures that all eﬃcient changes are implemented ex post.
48Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduce an innovative model of the authority relationship
that extends this theme. Their idea is that authority arises from the access to information
necessary to act. In their model, the principal with formal authority will delegate authority
to an agent who has better information. However, they will reserve the right to overrule an
agent when they are better informed. This model can be viewed as another way of explaining
employment contracts. The law gives the employer broad discretion when allocating tasks
to the employee, and the employer always has the formal right to change an employee’s task
as long as it is within the scope of work.
Finally, the allocation of authority also aﬀects the allocation of bargaining during contract
renegotiation that can occur when contractual instruments are incomplete and there is the
potential for holdup. Grossman and Hart (1986) use this idea to develop a theory of property
rights. On their account, ownership in practice means the allocation of authority over any
action entailing the use of property that is not constraint by any contractual obligations.
Several papers have extended this idea to the realm of legally binding contracts. Elfenbein
and Lerner (2003) ﬁnd that contract terms between internet portals and other ﬁrms during
the 1995-1999 period can be explained as a response to the problem of holdup. Kaplan and
Stromberg (2003) similarly show that venture capital ﬁnancing contracts appear to solve
a holdup problem. Both papers explore the choice of contractual instruments under the
hypothesis that they are enforceable, and hence leave open the question of how courts would
interpret such contractual instruments.
Finally, there is some work that studies the structure of hybrid contractual instruments
that deal with a number of transcations costs. Blair and Lafontaine (2005) provide a com-
prehensive review of both the economics and the law of franchising. This work describes the
enforceability of diﬀerent franchise clauses, though it leaves open the question of why the
law has a particular structure. The work of Arrunada et al. (2001) provides a rich analysis
of contract terms for car dealers in Spain, and show that these contractual instruments are
complex hybrid designed to deal with a number of transactions costs. It would be interesting
to know to what extent the principles of contract design apply in diﬀerent legal jurisdictions.
5 Concluding Discussion: Economics, Law and Practice
A theory of contracts studies the relation among four theoretical objects: contractual en-
vironments, contractual instruments, contract law, and contractual behavior. The relation
among these concepts is complex. In the short term, the contractual environment and
49contract law are exogenous; we thus seek to explain both contractual instruments and the
resulting contractual behavior in terms of the exogenously given contractual environment
and contract law. From a wider perpsective, however, both contract law and, to a lesser
extent, the contractual environment are endogenous. To a large extent, we choose the legal
rules that govern contractual instruments. Similarly, agents choose the environment in which
they contract; moreover they might act to alter the contractual environment in which they
ﬁnd themselves.
Each aspect of the literature on contract focuses on a diﬀerent explanatory question. The
mechanism design literature asks: for a given contractual environment, does a mechanism
exist that induces eﬃcient contractual behavior? In this literature, a mechanism conﬂates
contractual instruments and contract law; it examines contracts, the set of obligations that
result from the operation of contract law on contractual instruments Nevertheless, the liter-
ature assumes a legal system that is basically utopian.
The incomplete contracts literature, by contrast, seeks to explain the structure of ob-
served contractual instruments. It often begins with some observed contract form and then
asks: in what contractual environment is a speciﬁed contractual instrument optimal for the
parties? Once again, the structure and competence of the legal system is largely idealized.
The incomplete contracts literature explains the oddities of contractual instruments largely
without reference to any features of contract law.
The literature on the economic analysis of contract law, ﬁnally, abandons the assumption
of an ideal legal system. Rather, it often asks: given a contractual instrument within a
speciﬁc contractual environment, how does the legal rule inﬂuence contractual behavior?
Here, the legal system is not ideal though the literature has primarily relaxed only the
assumption of perfect enforcement.
Each of these literatures has provided signiﬁcant insight into contractual behavior and
the structure of contractual instruments. The mechanism design literature, for instance, has
provided clear, formal accounts of speciﬁc “transaction costs” such as asymmetric informa-
tion and analyzed the extent to which these features of the contractual environment impede
eﬃcient exchange. The assumption of an ideal legal system, however, limits the practical
insights available from these models. An assumption of perfect enforcement, for example,
implies that contractual behavior always conforms to the obligations embodied in the con-
tractual instrument. Indeed, rational parties need never invoke an ideal legal system; the
shadow of the law is suﬃcient to regulate behavior. Similarly, the assumption that inter-
pretation is unambiguous, clear and foreseeable implies that parties can always implement
50perfectly their intentions.
The economic analysis of contract law adopts complementary simplifying assumptions. It
generally studies very simple contractual environments; we have little idea how the ideal legal
rule would vary across contractual environments. Similarly, it generally focuses on the eﬀects
of legal rules on contractual behavior but ignores the eﬀects of legal rules on contractual
instruments. It has provided few explanations for variation in available remedies across
contractual environments and contractual instruments. Why, for instance, are common law
employment contracts at-will rather than protected by expectation damages? Moreover, the
formal study of interpretation is in its infancy. Models have very crude representations of
the the rules of interpretation in part because the literature has not exploited the language
formulated in Battigalli and Maggi (2002).
This caricatured sketch of these literatures points clearly to promising paths of future
research. We need to meld the sophisticated analyses of contractual environments and con-
tractual instruments to the simple models of non-ideal legal institutions. The mechanism
design literature might investigate the set of achievable allocations under non-ideal legal sys-
tems. Imperfect enforcement will impede the realziation of ﬁrst-best allocations. How good
must contract enforcement be to yield the ﬁrst-best? How costly is imperfect enforcement?
Relaxing the assumption of unambiguous interpretation is apt to be both more diﬃcult
and more fruitful. Contracting agents rarely use new or innovative language in their con-
tractual instruments. Contractual terms that have been subject to extensive interpretation
provide a more certain environment against which to contract. This observation that many
contractual terms might be sub-optimal relative to the world in which interpretation is un-
ambiguous and costless. Thus, at least some features of observed contracts, likely respond
to the failings of the courts and contract law.
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